

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MUTINTA MICHELO, KATHERINE SEAMAN,
and MARY RE SEAMAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2007-2; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2007-3
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC., in its own right and
as successor to NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.;
EGS FINANCIAL CARE INC., formerly known as
NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.; and
FORSTER & GARBUS LLP,

Defendants.

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) Index No.: 18-cv-1781
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) **CLASS ACTION**
) **COMPLAINT**
)

) **Jury Trial Demanded**
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) **FILED VIA ECF**
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Plaintiffs Mutinta Michelo, Katherine Seaman, and Mary Re Seaman (together, “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by the undersigned attorneys, allege as follows for this Class Action Complaint against defendants National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 and National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 (together, the “Trust Defendants”); Transworld Systems, Inc. (“Transworld”), in its own right and as successor to NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (“NCO”); EGS Financial Care Inc. (“EGS”), formerly known as NCO Financial Systems, Inc.; and Forster & Garbus LLP (“Forster”) (collectively, “Defendants”). These allegations are made on information and belief, and pursuant to the investigation by Plaintiffs’ counsel.

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. Defendants have engaged in a fraudulent scheme to make false representations to consumers and in court filings in order to obtain payment on debts that they cannot prove they are owed. Defendants have no idea whether, and how much money, they are owed. They nevertheless sue consumers, obtain judgments against them, and extract money from them.

2. The National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (“National Collegiate”)¹ have no employees, and use Transworld to collect debts allegedly owed on student loans. On behalf of National Collegiate, Transworld causes baseless lawsuits to be filed in state and local courts against consumers like Plaintiffs. Transworld coordinates with law firms throughout the country to sue consumers on National Collegiate’s behalf.

3. In the past three years more than 38,000 such actions have been filed with the assistance of debt-collection law firms, including Forster.

4. In September 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) penalized National Collegiate and Transworld \$21.6 million for prosecuting illegal debt-collection lawsuits.²

5. The CFPB found that National Collegiate and Transworld sued consumers in state courts over purported debts that they couldn’t prove were actually owed, or were too old to sue over.

¹ There are least fifteen National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts, including the two Trust Defendants presently named in this action. “National Collegiate,” as used herein, collectively refers to the larger group.

² Proposed Consent Judgment, *Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nat’l Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust et al.*, No. 1:17-cv-01323-UNA (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2017) (Dkt. No. 3-1) [annexed hereto as Exhibit A]; Consent Order, *In re Transworld Sys., Inc.*, Admin. Proc. No. 2017-CFPB-0018 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Sept. 18, 2017) [annexed hereto as Exhibit B].

6. National Collegiate insiders have confirmed that National Collegiate sues consumers without documentation proving loan ownership.³

7. Defendants have used a variety of illegal tricks to deceive consumers and state courts into believing that a National Collegiate Trust has a valid legal claim against consumers, when in reality it does not.

8. For example, Defendants' boilerplate complaints against New Yorkers including Plaintiffs falsely state that the Trust (1) "is the original creditor" of the loan at issue in the action, and (2) is "authorized to proceed with this action."

9. Both statements violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 *et seq.*, and New York General Business Law ("GBL") § 349.

10. No National Collegiate Trust is the "original creditor" for the alleged loan underlying the alleged debt that Defendants sue over. As Judge Shields of the Eastern District of New York recently explained, National Collegiate Trusts never originate student loans; instead they are the ultimate owners of bundles of student loan debt following a byzantine securitization process. Defendants' "original creditor" lie is unlawful because unsophisticated consumers like Plaintiffs might not realize that they are dealing with an entity far removed from the actual loan origination—and thus less likely to possess proof of indebtedness.⁴

³ *As Paperwork Goes Missing, Private Student Loan Debts May Be Wiped Away*, N.Y. Times, July 17, 2017, <https://nyti.ms/2vvroKs> (quoting Donald Uderitz of Vantage Capital Group) ("It's fraud to try to collect on loans that you don't own," Mr. Uderitz said. "We want no part of that[.]" [annexed hereto as Exhibit C]; *Behind the Lucrative Assembly Line of Student Debt Lawsuits*, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2017, <https://nyti.ms/2j1qMpZ> (noting Vantage Capital's approval of the CFPB action against National Collegiate) [annexed hereto as Exhibit D].

⁴ *Winslow v. Forster & Garbus, LLP*, No. 15-cv-2996 (AYS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205113, at *2 n.1, *27–29 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2017).

11. None of National Collegiate's Trusts is "authorized to proceed" with actions like the ones that Defendants prosecuted against Plaintiffs. New York law requires out-of-state entities that regularly file suit in this state's courts to register with its Department of State and pay tax. National Collegiate flouts this law, even as its Trusts file countless state-court lawsuits against New Yorkers like Plaintiffs.⁵

12. Defendants similarly employ illegal tactics later in the state-court litigation process. National Collegiate and Transworld have engaged in the widespread practice of submitting false or deceptive affidavits to state courts in order to fraudulently obtain default judgments against consumers for unprovable debts.⁶

13. The CFPB found that the Transworld employees or agents who fill out the affidavits filed on National Collegiate's behalf have falsely attested to personal knowledge of (1) the account records and the consumer's debt, and (2) the chain of assignments establishing entitlement to sue. In fact, they robo-sign the affidavits without reviewing any such evidence.⁷

14. As the CFPB's findings reveal, National Collegiate and Transworld's business model depends upon a pattern and practice of abusing the judicial system; they could not collect on their securitized student loan debt in any other way.

15. Essential to the scheme is the assistance of outside law firms like Forster. These attorneys, who are sworn officers of the court, forsake their legal and ethical duties to the court by

⁵ *Id.* at *29–34.

⁶ Defendants take advantage of the fact that, under most states' civil procedure law, including New York's, the public employees who oversee the default-judgment process rely upon the representations and certifications of the attorneys who practice before the court. Given that tens of thousands of such lawsuits are filed every year, judicial system personnel would be overwhelmed if they had to investigate the validity of every default judgment application.

⁷ Proposed Consent Judgment, *supra* note 2, at 3. Indeed, these affidavits are churned out with such rapidity that they are signed in the absence of a notary, in violation of evidentiary law. *Id.*

filing pleadings and affidavits that they know to be both deceptive, and insufficient as a matter of civil procedure and evidentiary law.

16. While the boilerplate complaints and motions that Forster has filed on National Collegiate's behalf purport to be communications from an attorney, in fact they were not meaningfully reviewed by an attorney prior to filing. Instead, they were created by automated systems and non-attorney support staff.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. Defendants conduct business in the State of New York, and Defendants' fraud upon Plaintiffs was coordinated in this District. Venue is proper in this District.

18. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1337, and under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

19. This Court has jurisdiction over the New York state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

20. This Court also has jurisdiction over all the claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), in that "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is a class action in which . . . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant."

PARTIES

Plaintiffs

21. Plaintiff Mutinta Michelo is a resident of Texas, and previously resided in Bronx County, New York. Ms. Michelo is a consumer as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Defendants initiated and maintained at least one action against Ms. Michelo alleging claims related to consumer debt.

22. Plaintiff Katherine Seaman (“K. Seaman”) resides in Queens County, New York. Ms. K. Seaman is a consumer as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Defendants initiated and maintained at least one action against Ms. K. Seaman alleging claims related to consumer debt.

23. Plaintiff Mary Re Seaman (“Re Seaman”) resides in Queens County, New York. Plaintiff Re Seaman is a consumer as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Defendants initiated and maintained at least one action against Ms. Re Seaman alleging claims related to consumer debt.

Defendants

24. Defendant National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 is a Delaware statutory trust that does business in New York. Its trustee and agent for service of process is Wilmington Trust Company, 1100 N. Market St., Rodney Sq., Wilmington, Delaware 19890. According to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings, National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 holds 3,950 loans made to New York consumers, with principal amounts thereupon totaling \$42,449,751.⁸

25. Defendant National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 is a Delaware statutory trust that does business in New York. Its trustee and agent for service of process is Wilmington Trust Company, 1100 N. Market St., Rodney Sq., Wilmington, Delaware 19890. According to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings, National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-

⁸ See Prospectus Supplement, National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 (June 12, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1223029/000089968107000462/ncslt20072-ps_061207.htm.

3 holds 4,894 loans made to New York consumers, with principal amounts thereupon totaling \$70,351,498.⁹

26. Defendant Transworld Systems, Inc. is a California corporation that maintains its principal place of business at 500 Virginia Drive, Suite 514, Ft. Washington, Pennsylvania 19034. Transworld does business in New York. Transworld regularly attempts to collect debts alleged to be due to another. Transworld is, either directly or indirectly, owned by Platinum Equity, LLC. Until on or about November 3, 2014, Transworld was owned by Expert Global Solutions, Inc. Transworld is the successor to Defendant NCO Financial Systems, Inc.

27. Defendant NCO Financial Systems, Inc., presently doing business as EGS Financial Care, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation that maintains offices at 400 Horsham Road, Suite 130, Horsham, Pennsylvania 19044. NCO does business in New York and regularly attempts to collect debts alleged to be due to another.

28. Defendant Forster & Garbus LLP is a law firm, located at 60 Motor Parkway, Commack, New York 11725. Forster does business in New York and regularly attempts to collect debts alleged to be due to another. Forster has been retained by National Collegiate to collect on consumer debt that National Collegiate claims to own. Pursuant to that retention, Forster files and maintains actions in New York State courts seeking debt collection. As part of the filing of each such case, Forster, as it is obligated to do under New York State law, includes a certification pursuant to Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) § 130-1.1a.

⁹ See Prospectus Supplement, National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1223029/000110465907069961/a07-23573_18424b5.htm.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

29. This action is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs individually and as a class action on behalf of the following class (“Class”):

(a) all persons sued in state-court lawsuits related to the collection of consumer debt, (b) in which any Trust Defendant was identified as plaintiff in the complaint, (c) within six years of the date of the filing of this action. Excluded from the Class are the officers and directors of any Defendant, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which any Defendant has or had a controlling interest, at all relevant times.

30. While the exact number of Class members can only be determined through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe that there are thousands of members of the Class.

31. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class, as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct, as complained of herein.

32. There are common questions of law and fact affecting members of the Class, which common questions predominate over questions that might affect individual members. These questions include, but are not limited to, the following:

- a. Whether Defendants initiated state-court lawsuits against consumers without the intent or ability to prove the claims;
- b. Whether Defendants filed materially deceptive pleadings and/or motions in connection with said lawsuits;
- c. Whether Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class are entitled to damages, including punitive damages, costs, and/or attorneys’ fees, for Defendants’ acts and conduct as alleged herein, and the proper measure thereof.

33. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the other members of the Class. Plaintiffs have no interests that conflict with the interests of other Class members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation.

34. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members might be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to redress individually the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.

35. Members of the Class can be identified from records maintained by Defendants, and can be notified of the pendency of this action by United States mail using a form of notice customarily used in similar class actions.

FACTS

National Collegiate

36. At \$1.3 trillion, the student loan debt load is second only to that of mortgages in terms of size and risk posed to American consumers. National Collegiate holds \$12 billion of this debt, with more than \$5 billion of it now classed as in default.

37. National Collegiate and its agents file baseless state-court collection suits supported by boilerplate, robo-signed legal filings that are unsupported by actual admissible evidence.

38. National Collegiate and its agents engage in such tactics, because National Collegiate's constituent Trusts were too removed from any actual loan origination process to guarantee access to documentation evidencing a consumer's indebtedness.

39. National Collegiate's constituent Trusts were created between approximately 2001 and 2007 by First Marblehead Corp. Through subsidiary The National Collegiate Funding LLC, First Marblehead Corp. purchased, in bulk, student loans that had been originated by large lenders. The National Collegiate Funding LLC later sold those loans to one of the Trusts. Each Trust then issued asset-backed securities.

NCO and Transworld

40. As National Collegiate's Trusts have no employees, all acts performed nominally by a Trust, or on its behalf, are actually done by servicing agents or attorneys hired by these servicing agents.

41. The servicing agents began debt collection activities against consumers once their loans were determined to be in default. They also accepted payments made by consumers in response to these collection efforts, and oversaw custody of the resulting moneys.

42. As of 2013, Defendant NCO acted as National Collegiate's servicing agent.

43. On or about November 1, 2014, Defendant Transworld became National Collegiate's servicing agent.¹⁰

44. The same personnel, practices, and form documents were employed by NCO and Transworld in collecting the National Collegiate debts before and after the changeover from NCO to Transworld.

45. Transworld—like NCO before it—has maintained a nationwide network of debt-collection law firms, including Forster ("Network Firms"), through which it coordinates and implements collections on National Collegiate's behalf.

46. Network Firms work on a contingency basis.

47. Network Firms are not permitted to contact National Collegiate directly, even for the purpose of obtaining requisite proof of a consumer's indebtedness on a student loan, and/or National Collegiate's entitlement to sue thereupon.

48. NCO and Transworld grade Network Firms on, among other indices, the rate at

¹⁰ NCO and Transworld were both owned by Expert Global Solutions, Inc. until November 2014, when Transworld was sold to Platinum Equity.

which they file suit against consumers on behalf of National Collegiate, and the speed with which judgments in such suits are procured and collected upon.

49. NCO and Transworld support staff work with non-attorney support staff at Network Firms to facilitate the prosecution of collection actions against consumers like Plaintiffs.

50. This coordination includes the content of state-court pleadings, and the preparation of affidavits necessary to procure judgments against consumers.

Forster

51. Forster is a debt collection law firm that exclusively, or nearly exclusively, represents purported creditors (both original and debt buyers) in state-court actions against consumers.

52. Forster has filed hundreds, if not thousands, of state-court lawsuits against New Yorkers allegedly indebted to a National Collegiate Trust.

53. Forster's court filings on behalf of National Collegiate were mass-produced by non-lawyers at the push of a button, and then signed by attorneys who had done nothing to confirm the validity of the allegations and claims lodged against the consumer-defendants, including Plaintiffs.

54. Forster did not possess, and did not review, any actual documentary support for the actions it prosecuted against any Plaintiff on any Trust Defendant's behalf.

55. Forster's debt-collection litigation activities, including against Plaintiffs, are dependent upon: (1) a computer system used to communicate with clients like National Collegiate and Transworld, and to automatically generate court filings in actions against consumers like Plaintiffs; and (2) a non-attorney support staff that far outnumbers Forster's attorneys.

56. Like all of Forster's litigation filings on behalf of National Collegiate, the pleadings filed against Plaintiffs were automatically generated based on a preexisting template. These

boilerplate pleadings are identical, save for the dates and the few pieces of information that have been auto-populated into the template using the electronic data provided by Transworld or NCO concerning the consumer being sued.

57. Like all New York State attorneys, Forster’s lawyers are obligated, under Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) §§ 130-1.1 & 130-1.1a, to conduct a reasonable investigation into the legal and factual basis of any civil action that they initiate and maintain on a client’s behalf.

58. Forster attorneys ignore this obligation, robo signing National Collegiate complaints, and maintaining the actions for National Collegiate’s benefit, without conducting such reasonable investigation.

59. Indeed, during the time period relevant here, Forster’s handful of attorneys signed so many complaints on a daily basis—not just for National Collegiate, but also for the country’s largest credit card debt buyers—that it was impossible for them to conduct such reasonable investigation.

60. The default-judgment filings that Forster submits on National Collegiate’s behalf are similarly auto-generated and robo signed, and/or filed in state courts without meaningful attorney review.

Defendants Target Plaintiffs

Plaintiff Mutinta Michelo

61. On or about July 14, 2015, Forster initiated a lawsuit against Plaintiff Michelo, in Bronx County Civil Court, in which National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 (“Trust 2007-2”) was named as plaintiff, and Plaintiff Michelo as co-defendant. The case caption and index number are: *National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 v. Michelo*, No. 10689-15/BX.

62. This lawsuit was initiated at the direction, express or implied, of Transworld and/or NCO.

63. On information and belief, the complaint in that lawsuit was prepared using a boilerplate template. The same boilerplate complaint was used in hundreds, if not thousands, of cases that Forster filed on National Collegiate's behalf.

64. The complaint against Plaintiff Michelo accused her of obtaining an "EDUCATIONAL LOAN" and being in default upon it. This complaint set forth causes of action for breach of contract and account stated.

65. The complaint states, among other things, that "PLAINTIFF [*i.e.*, Trust 2007-2] IS THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR"

66. This statement is false, because Trust 2007-2 did not originate the purported loan underlying the alleged debt being sued upon.

67. The complaint does not identify the entity that actually originated this purported loan, to the extent it even exists and/or was extended to Plaintiff Michelo.¹¹

68. The complaint also states that Trust 2007-2 "IS AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH THIS ACTION." This statement is false, because Trust 2007-2 failed to file a certificate of designation with the New York State Department of State and is not permitted to maintain a lawsuit in New York.

69. New York law requires that "[a]ny association doing business within this state . . . shall not maintain any action . . . in this state unless and until such association has filed the certificate of designation prescribed by [statute] and it has paid to the state all fees, penalties

¹¹ In addition to other law, New York City Administrative Code § 20-493.1 specifically requires that "the originating creditor of the debt" be identified in any debt-collection "communication with [a] consumer"

and franchise taxes for the years or parts thereof during which it did business in this state without having filed” the required designation. N.Y. Gen. Ass’ns Law § 18(4).

70. An “association” for the purposes of this law includes any “business trust,” defined as “any association operating a business under a written instrument or declaration of trust, the beneficial interest under which is divided into shares represented by certificates.” N.Y. Gen. Ass’ns Law § 2(2).

71. Trust 2007-2 is a “business trust” for the purposes of this law.

72. Trust 2007-2 is “doing business” in New York for purposes of this law based upon numerous indicia, including, but not limited to, the following:

- a. Trust 2007-2 maintains offices at 230 Park Avenue, and 100 Wall Street, in Manhattan.
- b. Trust 2007-2 has undertaken extensive debt collection efforts in New York, including taking pre-litigation collection action against thousands of New York consumers, and bringing at least 328 state-court collection actions in New York courts over the past six years.¹²
- c. The documents defining Trust 2007-2’s activities are virtually entirely focused on New York as the locus of all activity related to it. For example, these documents state that the finance settlement is to take place in New York; require Trust 2007-2 to maintain an office in Manhattan, New York City, for transfer- or exchange-registration purposes; specify application of New York law with regard to, for example, offered securities, the indenture, the administration agreement,

¹² Because these figures encompass only those courts participating in the New York State Unified Court System’s “eCourts” program, they represent a low estimate.

and the back-up administration agreement; the securities—the offering of which is Trust 2007-2’s purpose—will be offered through and “will be ready for delivery in book-entry form only through the facilities of The Depository Trust Company in New York, New York,” which “is a New York-chartered limited-purpose trust company”; and Trust 2007-2’s administrator, First Marblehead Data Services, Inc., has a principal place of business in New York City.

73. The complaint that Forster filed against Plaintiff Michelo on behalf of Trust 2007-2 contains a Rule 130-1.1a certification attesting that the signing attorney had engaged in meaningful review of the claims being lodged on Trust 2007-2’s behalf.

74. As no such meaningful review had occurred, this Rule 130-1.1a certification was false.

75. The complaint against Plaintiff Michelo sought \$22,047.88. No delineation was provided as to the extent to which this amount reflected interest or charges rather than principal.

76. On or about December 9, 2016, Forster filed a notice of voluntarily discontinuing Defendants’ action against Plaintiff Michelo.

77. Despite the fact that Defendants discontinued this lawsuit, Defendants falsely reported to credit bureaus that the underlying alleged debt was valid and owed.

Plaintiffs Katherine Seaman and Mary Re Seaman

78. On or about May 29, 2014, Forster initiated a lawsuit against Plaintiffs K. Seaman and Re Seaman (together, the “Seaman Plaintiffs”), in Queens County Civil Court, in which National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 (“Trust 2007-3”) was named as plaintiff, and the Seaman Plaintiffs as co-defendants. The case caption and index number are: *National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 v. Seaman*, No. 15713-14/QU.

79. That lawsuit was initiated at the direction, express or implied, of Transworld and/or NCO.

80. On information and belief, the complaint was prepared using a boilerplate template. The same boilerplate complaint was used in hundreds, if not thousands, of cases that Forster filed on National Collegiate's behalf.

81. The complaint against the Seaman Plaintiffs accused them of being in default upon a promissory note agreement and set forth causes of action for breach of contract and account stated.

82. This complaint states, among other things, that "PLAINTIFF [*i.e.*, Trust 2007-3] IS THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR"

83. This statement is false, because Trust Defendant 2007-3 did not originate the purported agreement underlying the alleged debt being sued upon.

84. The complaint does not identify the entity that actually did originate this purported agreement, to the extent it even exists and/or was extended to the Seaman Plaintiffs.¹³

85. The complaint also states that Trust 2007-3 "IS AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH THIS ACTION."

86. This statement is false, because Trust 2007-3 failed to file a certificate of designation with the New York State Department of State and is not permitted to maintain a lawsuit in New York.

87. New York law requires that any "[a]ny association doing business within this state . . . shall not maintain any action . . . in this state unless and until such association has filed

¹³ In addition to other law, New York City Administrative Code § 20-493.1 specifically requires that "the originating creditor of the debt" be identified in any debt-collection "communication with [a] consumer"

the certificate of designation prescribed by [statute] and it has paid to the state all fees, penalties and franchise taxes for the years or parts thereof during which it did business in this state without having filed” the required designation. N.Y. Gen. Ass’ns Law § 18(4).

88. An “association” for the purposes of this law includes any “business trust,” defined as “any association operating a business under a written instrument or declaration of trust, the beneficial interest under which is divided into shares represented by certificates.” N.Y. Gen. Ass’ns Law § 2(2).

89. Trust 2007-3 is a “business trust” for the purposes of this law.

90. Trust 2007-3 is “doing business” in New York for purposes of this law based upon numerous indicia, including, but not limited to, the following:

- a. Trust 2007-3 maintains offices at 230 Park Avenue, and 100 Wall Street, in Manhattan.
- b. Trust 2007-3 has undertaken extensive debt collection efforts in New York, including taking pre-litigation collection action against thousands of New York consumers, and bringing at least 260 state-court collection actions in New York courts over the past six years.¹⁴
- c. The documents defining Trust 2007-3’s activities are virtually entirely focused on New York as the locus of all activity related to it. For example, these documents state that the finance settlement is to take place in New York; require Trust 2007-3 to maintain an office in Manhattan, New York City, for transfer- or exchange-registration purposes; specify application of New York law with regard

¹⁴ Because these figures encompass only those courts participating in the New York State Unified Court System’s “eCourts” program, they represent a low estimate.

to, for example, offered securities, the indenture, the administration agreement, and the back-up administration agreement; the securities—the offering of which is Trust 2007-3’s purpose—will be offered through and “will be ready for delivery in book-entry form only through the facilities of The Depository Trust Company in New York, New York,” which “is a New York-chartered limited-purpose trust company”; and Trust 2007-3’s administrator, First Marblehead Data Services, Inc., has a principal place of business in New York City.

91. The complaint that Forster filed against the Seaman Plaintiffs on behalf of Trust 2007-3 contains a Rule 130-1.1a certification attesting that the signing attorney had engaged in meaningful review of the claims being lodged on Trust 2007-3’s behalf.

92. As no such meaningful review had occurred, this Rule 130-1.1a certification was false.

93. This complaint against the Seaman Plaintiffs sought \$24,324.29. No delineation was provided as to the extent to which this amount reflected interest and charges rather than principal.

94. On or about March 30, 2015, Forster, on behalf of Trust 2007-3, filed an application for default judgment in this action against the Seaman Plaintiffs.¹⁵

95. Submitted in conjunction with this application was an affidavit from Transworld employee James H. Cummins, who testified that: “I am competent and authorized to testify relating to this action through personal knowledge of the business records, including the electronic data, sent to [Transworld] that detail the education loan records.”

¹⁵ Notably, this application had been prepared by Forster months earlier, on or about October 21, 2014.

96. On information and belief, Mr. Cummins lacked personal knowledge of the business records, including the electronic data, showing that the Seaman Plaintiffs owed the alleged debt in question.

97. Mr. Cummins was instructed to review data on a computer screen to verify information in the affidavit about this alleged debt. However, he did not know the source of the data on that screen, how the data was obtained or maintained, whether it was accurate, or whether the data meant that the debt was in fact owed to Trust 2007-3.

98. Mr. Cummins further testified through the affidavit that: “I also have personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of [Trust 2007-3] and the practices and procedures [Trust 2007-3] requires of its loan servicers and other agents.”

99. On information and belief, Mr. Cummins lacked personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of Trust 2007-3 and the practices and procedures of its agents.

100. Mr. Cummins’ affidavit against the Seaman Plaintiffs was purportedly notarized by Dudley Turner, a DeKalb County, Georgia, Notary Public, on March 20, 2015. The affidavit also contains a certification, from Georgia attorney Kristian Knochel (Georgia Bar # 426673), swearing that the affidavit’s notarization was lawfully performed.

101. On information and belief, this notarization was defective for various reasons, including, but not limited to:

- a. Mr. Cummins executed this affidavit outside the presence of Mr. Turner;
- b. Mr. Turner did not place Mr. Cummins under oath before Mr. Cummins signed it.

102. The default judgment application that Forster filed against the Seaman Plaintiffs on behalf of Trust 2007-3 contains the signature of Forster attorney Joel Leiderman, who thereby

certified pursuant to Rule 130-1.1a that he had engaged in meaningful review of the claims made on Trust 2007-3's behalf.

103. As no such meaningful review had occurred, this Rule 130-1.1a certification was false.

104. Mr. Leiderman and Forster knew when they filed Mr. Cummins' affidavit that it was not based on the requisite personal knowledge of proof of indebtedness.¹⁶ They filed this affidavit anyway, because under New York law they could not have procured the default judgment against the Seaman Plaintiffs without an affidavit of "proof of the facts constituting the claim . . . and the amount due" CPLR 3215(f).

105. The application for default judgment against the Seaman Plaintiffs was granted by the Queens County Civil Court Clerk on or about March 31, 2015. With costs and fees added to the amount sought in the complaint, the total judgment amount was \$24,609.29.

106. On or about April 15, 2015, Forster, on behalf of Trust 2007-3, caused an income execution to be issued to Plaintiff Re Seaman's employer in conjunction with the recent default judgment.

107. Plaintiff Re Seaman's wages have been garnished due to this income execution.

¹⁶ Among other defects, this affidavit violated New York law, because it was impermissibly created by a nonparty (Transworld). Only "the party" seeking judgment—here, Trust 2007-3—may swear out the requisite affidavit of proof in support of a default judgment application. CPLR 3215(f) (emphasis added).

Defendants' Scheme Unravels

108. After many years in operation, and countless consumers victimized, a series of public events in the last several months finally shed a spotlight on Defendants' scheme.

Donald Uderitz Speaks Out

109. Donald Uderitz is the founder of Vantage Capital Group, a private equity firm that is the beneficial owner of National Collegiate. His company keeps whatever money is left after National Collegiate's noteholders are paid off.

110. Mr. Uderitz granted an interview to the *New York Times* for a July 17, 2017 article about National Collegiate's systematic inability to produce proof of indebtedness and entitlement to sue.¹⁷

111. Mr. Uderitz told the *New York Times* that an audit of Transworld which he had paid for revealed that, of a random sample of roughly 400 National Collegiate loans, not one had paperwork evidencing the chain of ownership.

112. As the *New York Times* article states:

While Mr. Uderitz wants to collect money from students behind on their bills, he says he wants the lawsuits against borrowers to stop, at least until he can get more information about the documentation that underpins the loans.

"It's fraud to try to collect on loans that you don't own," Mr. Uderitz said. "We want no part of that." (emphasis added).

The CFPB's Findings

113. Several weeks after Mr. Uderitz's comments to the *New York Times*, the CFPB announced its findings against National Collegiate and Transworld following a years-long investigation.

¹⁷ See *supra* note 3, attached hereto as Exhibit C.

114. The CFPB penalized National Collegiate and Transworld for three categories of lawbreaking: (1) filing lawsuits without the intent or ability to prove the claims, if contested; (2) filing lawsuits over time-barred debt; and (3) filing false and misleading affidavits in support of lawsuits against consumers.

115. As to the first category, filing baseless lawsuits, the CFPB found that, among other things:

Defendants filed at least 1,214 collections lawsuits against consumers even though the documentation needed to prove they owned the loans was missing. Through these lawsuits, the Defendants obtained approximately \$21,768,807 in judgments against consumers. . . .

In these lawsuits, documentation of a complete chain of assignment evidencing that the subject loan was transferred to the Defendants was missing. . . .

In addition, the Defendants filed at least 812 collections lawsuits where the documentation did not support Trusts' ownership of the loans. The chain of assignment documentation shows that these loans were allegedly transferred to Defendants before they were in fact disbursed to consumers. . . .

In at least 208 other collections lawsuits, the promissory note to prove that a debt was owed did not exist or cannot be located. . . .

For each collections lawsuit described [above], Defendants could not prove that a debt was owed to Defendants, if contested. . . .

Defendants knew, or their processes should have uncovered, that these chain of assignment documents were missing or flawed, yet Defendants continued to file collections lawsuits.¹⁸

116. As to suing over time-barred alleged debts, the CFPB found that:

In at least 486 collections lawsuits, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt from consumers, Defendants filed a collections

¹⁸ Compl. ¶¶ 52–57, *Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nat'l Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust et al.*, No. 1:17-cv-01323-UNA (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2017) (Dkt. No. 1) [annexed hereto as Exhibit E].

lawsuit outside the applicable statute of limitations.¹⁹

117. As to the false and misleading affidavits, the CFPB found that, among other things:

In the[] affidavits, the affiants swore that they had personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the debt. . . .

In fact, in numerous instances, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the debt when they executed the affidavits. . . .

The affiants also swore in the affidavits that they were authorized and competent to testify about the consumers' debts through review of and "personal knowledge" of the business records, including electronic data, in their possession. . . .

In fact, in numerous instances, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the business records, including the electronic data, showing that consumers owed debts to the Defendants. . . .

Affiants were instructed to review data on a computer screen to verify information in the affidavits about the debts. Affiants, however, did not know the source of the data on that screen, how the data was obtained or maintained, whether it was accurate, or whether those data meant that the debt was in fact owed to Defendants. . . .

Each affiant also swore that he or she had "personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of Plaintiff [National Collegiate] and the practices and procedures Plaintiff requires of its loan servicers and other agents." . . .

In fact, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of Defendants and the practices and procedures of Defendants' agents. . . .

In many affidavits, the affiants also swore, "I have reviewed the chain of title records as business records" regarding the relevant account. . . .

In fact, in numerous instances, affiants did not review the chain of assignment records prior to executing the affidavits. In some cases, affiants reviewed only "chain of title" records that had been found online. In fact, at least one of Defendants' Servicers instructed affiants that they did not need to review the chain of assignment records before executing affidavits that represented that the affiant had reviewed those records. . . .

¹⁹ *Id.* ¶ 58.

In fact, affiants did not have access to deposit and sale agreements—the last link in the chain of assignment transferring loans into National Collegiate—until May 30, 2014. . . .

In many affidavits, the affiants asserted that they had personal knowledge that the loans were transferred, sold, and assigned to National Collegiates on dates certain. . . .

In fact, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the chain of assignment records necessary to prove that the relevant Trust owned the subject loan. . . .

In some instances, when affiants complained to management that they did not have personal knowledge of certain representations made in the affidavits, Defendants’ Servicers instructed the affiants to continue signing the affidavits. In some instances, affiants felt “bullied” by management and followed the instructions for fear of losing their jobs.²⁰

118. Indeed, during a June 2017 deposition in an unrelated state-court action, a Transworld paralegal testified that the affiants review as many as 40 loan files on a daily basis.²¹

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT)
(Against Transworld, NCO, EGS, & Forster)

119. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every paragraph set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

120. Each Plaintiff is a “consumer,” as that term is defined by the FDCPA, *see* 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

²⁰ *Id.* ¶¶ 27–39 (emphasis added). The CFPB further found that these affidavits were improperly notarized, because, among other things, the notaries did not witness the affiants signing them. *Id.* ¶¶ 43–51.

²¹ Bradley Luke Dep. Tr. 40:21–41:10, *Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3 v. Thurlow*, No. PORDC-CV-15-324 (Me. Super. Ct., Cumberland Cnty.) (June 16, 2017).

121. Transworld is a “debt collector,” as that term is defined by the FDCPA, *see* 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

122. NCO is a “debt collector,” as that term is defined by the FDCPA, *see* 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

123. EGS is a “debt collector,” as that term is defined by the FDCPA, *see* 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

124. The FDCPA was enacted to stop “the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).

125. The FDCPA identifies sixteen specific, nonexclusive prohibited debt collection practices, and generally prohibits a debt collector from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Among the acts prohibited are: the false representation of “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A); “[t]he false representation or implication . . . that any communication is from an attorney[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3); “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5); “[c]ommunicating . . . credit information which is known or which should be known to be false[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8); and “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).

126. The FDCPA also prohibits debt collectors from “us[ing] unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.

127. Defendants violated the FDCPA by making false and misleading representations, using deceptive means, and engaging in unfair and abusive practices. Defendants’ violations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- a. filing lawsuits against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein, without the intent or ability to prove the claims, if contested;
- b. filing lawsuits against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein, for the sole purpose of procuring default judgments against consumers and/or extracting settlements from them;
- c. falsely representing that a Trust Defendant was “authorized to proceed” with the state-court actions filed against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein;
- d. falsely representing that a Trust Defendant was the “original creditor” in the state-court actions filed against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein;
- e. failing to identify, as required by law, the true originating entity for the loan being sued upon in the state-court actions filed against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein;
- f. filing complaints against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein, that were deceptive and misleading in that they were signed by an attorney but were not, in fact, meaningfully reviewed by an attorney;
- g. filing default judgment affidavits against Plaintiffs or other members of the class, as described herein, that were false or deceptive in that the affiant claimed personal knowledge of proof of indebtedness, when he or she in fact lacked such knowledge; and,

- h. communicating credit information adverse to any Plaintiff or other member of the class, as described herein, where that information is false or should be known to be false.

128. The acts and practices herein set forth were deceptive, misleading, and fraudulent. Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged as a result of these violations, and are entitled to relief as provided for by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

**(N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349)
(Against All Defendants)**

129. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every paragraph set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

130. Plaintiffs are New York consumers entitled to the protection afforded under Article 22-A of the General Business Law (“GBL”), entitled “Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices.”

131. GBL § 349 provides that “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in [New York] are hereby declared unlawful.”

132. A GBL § 349 cause of action accrues when consumer-oriented conduct would be deceptive and materially misleading to a reasonable consumer, and causes damages.

133. Defendants’ acts and omissions are directed at consumers and include, but are not limited to:

- a. filing lawsuits against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein, without the intent or ability to prove the claims, if contested;

- b. filing lawsuits against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein, for the sole purpose of procuring default judgments against consumers and/or extracting settlements from them;
- c. falsely representing that a Trust Defendant was “authorized to proceed” with the state-court actions filed against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein;
- d. falsely representing that a Trust Defendant was the “original creditor” in the state-court actions filed against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein;
- e. failing to identify, as required by law, the true originating entity for the loan being sued upon in the state-court actions filed against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein;
- f. filing complaints against Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein, that were deceptive and misleading in that they were signed by an attorney but were not, in fact, meaningfully reviewed by an attorney;
- g. filing default judgment affidavits against any Plaintiff or other member of the class, as described herein, that were false or deceptive in that the affiant claimed personal knowledge of proof of indebtedness, when he or she in fact lacked such knowledge; and,
- h. communicating credit information adverse to Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, as described herein, where that information is false or known to be false.

134. The acts and practices herein set forth were deceptive, misleading, and fraudulent. As a result of such practices, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were injured, suffered damages, and are entitled to relief as provided for by GBL § 349(h).

AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK JUDICIARY LAW § 487)

(Against Forster)

135. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every paragraph set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

136. New York Judiciary Law § 487 provides as follows: “An attorney or counselor who . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party . . . [i]s guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by the penal law, he forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.”

137. As set forth above, Forster violated New York Judiciary Law § 487 by engaging in a chronic, persistent pattern of conduct with the intent to deceive consumer-defendants and multiple New York courts. Forster’s violations include, but are not limited to:

- a. commencing actions against consumers on behalf of a Trust Defendant without sufficient factual basis, yet backed by an attorney’s Rule 130 certifications falsely stating that, to the best of his or her knowledge, and after an inquiry “reasonable under the circumstances,” the complaint and the contentions therein were not frivolous;
- b. filing complaints against consumers that falsely stated that a Trust Defendant was the “original creditor” with respect to the student loan at issue in the action;

- c. filing complaints against consumers that falsely stated that a Trust Defendant was “authorized to proceed with th[e] action”;
- d. filing default judgment applications on behalf of a Trust Defendant without reasonable inquiry into the validity of the claims made against the consumer-defendant; and,
- e. submitting default judgment affidavits on behalf of a Trust Defendant where the affiant falsely attested to personal knowledge of proof of indebtedness.

138. As a result of Forster’s deceitful and fraudulent conduct, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have been injured. Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to relief, as provided for by New York Judiciary Law § 487, in an amount to be determined at trial.

TOLLING OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

Discovery Rule Tolling

139. Plaintiffs could not have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, within the time periods of the statutes of limitation for the FDCPA and GBL § 349, that Defendants had perpetrated their fraudulent scheme against them.

140. Plaintiffs did not know, and could not have known, essential elements of their claims until the publication of the CFPB’s findings against National Collegiate and Transworld on September 18, 2017, including that Defendants have (1) filed lawsuits without the intent or ability to prove the claims, if contested, and (2) submitted affidavits where the affiant falsely attested to personal knowledge of proof of indebtedness.

141. Therefore, the running of these statutes of limitations have been suspended with respect to any claims that Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have as a result of Defendants’ fraudulent scheme by virtue of the discovery rule doctrine.

Fraudulent Concealment Tolling

142. Throughout the time period relevant to this action, Defendants affirmatively concealed from Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class the fraudulent scheme described herein. As such, neither Plaintiffs nor the other members of the Class could have discovered, even upon reasonable exercise of diligence, that Defendants had secured default judgments against them through the fraudulent scheme described herein.

143. Among other things, the false and misleading statements contained in the affidavits that were signed by Transworld and/or NCO employees, and that Forster and National Collegiate's other outside law firms filed on behalf of Trust Defendants in support of applications for default judgments against Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class, concealed the existence of Defendants' fraudulent scheme.

144. Therefore, the running of the applicable statutes of limitations have been suspended until September 18, 2017, by virtue of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, with respect to any FDCPA and GBL § 349 claims that Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have as a result of Defendants' fraudulent scheme.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, demand judgment as follows:

- i) Declaring this Action to be a proper plaintiffs' class action, declaring Plaintiffs to be proper representatives of the Class, and declaring Plaintiffs' Counsel to be class counsel;

- ii) On the First Cause of Action, under the FDCPA, awarding Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class statutory and actual damages as provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k;
- iii) On the Second Cause of Action, under New York's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, awarding such preliminary injunctive and ancillary relief as might be necessary to avert the likelihood of consumer injury during the pendency of this action; and entering a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of the GBL by Defendants;
- iv) On the Second Cause of Action, under New York's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, awarding statutory and actual damages as provided by GBL § 349(h);
- v) On the Third Cause of Action, under New York Judiciary Law § 487, awarding Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class monetary damages in an amount to be determined at trial, and treble damages, as provided by said statute;
- vi) Awarding Plaintiffs costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses; and
- vii) Granting such other and further relief as the Court might deem just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York
February 27, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK LLP

By: /s/ Gregory A. Frank
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Exhibit A

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE**

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Plaintiff,

v.

THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE MASTER STUDENT LOAN TRUST; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2003-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2004-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2004-2; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2005-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2005-2; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2005-3; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-2; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-3; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-4; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2007-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2007-2; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2007-3; and NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2007-4, Delaware Statutory Trusts,

Defendants.

Case No.

[PROPOSED] CONSENT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“Bureau”), commenced this civil action against fifteen (15) Delaware statutory trusts referred to as the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (“NCSLTs” or “the Trusts”), which are the National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, NCSLT 2003-1, NCSLT 2004-1, NCSLT 2004-2, NCSLT 2005-1, NCSLT 2005-2, NCSLT 2005-3, NCSLT 2006-1, NCSLT 2006-2, NCSLT 2006-3, NCSLT 2006-4, NCSLT 2007-1, NCSLT 2007-2, NCSLT 2007-3, and NCSLT 2007-4 on September 14, 2017, to obtain injunctive relief, damages and other monetary relief, and civil money penalties.

The Complaint alleges violations of sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1).

Plaintiff and Defendants request that the Court enter this Consent Judgment. The parties have agreed to resolve this case without further litigation. The Defendants waive service, answering the Complaint, and consent to the entry of this Consent Judgment against them by this Court, the terms of which are set forth herein.

FINDINGS

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action.
2. Plaintiff and Defendants agree to entry of this Order to settle and resolve all matters in this dispute arising from the conduct alleged in the Complaint to the date this Order is entered.
3. Defendants neither admit nor deny any allegations in the Complaint, except as specifically stated in this Order. For the purposes of this Order,

Defendants admit the facts necessary to establish the Court's jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of this action.

4. Since at least November 1, 2012, in order to collect on defaulted private student loans, Defendants' Servicers filed Collections Lawsuits on behalf of Defendants in state courts across the country. In support of these lawsuits, Subservicers on behalf of Defendants executed and filed affidavits that falsely claimed personal knowledge of the account records and the consumer's debt, and in many cases, personal knowledge of the chain of assignments establishing ownership of the loans. In addition, Defendants' Servicers on behalf of Defendants filed more than 2,000 debt collections lawsuits without the documentation necessary to prove Trust ownership of the loans or on debt that was time-barred. Finally, notaries for Defendants' Servicers notarized over 25,000 affidavits even though they did not witness the affiants' signatures.
5. Defendants waive any rights to seek judicial review or otherwise challenge or contest the validity of this Order. Defendants also waive any claim it may have under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, concerning the prosecution of this action to the date of this Order. Each party will bear its own costs and expenses, including without limitation attorneys' fees.
6. Entry of this Order is in the public interest.

DEFINITIONS

7. The following definitions apply to this Order:

- a. “Administration Agreements” means the agreements by and among each of the Trusts and the Administrator dated November 1, 2001 (Master Trust); December 11, 2003 (NCSLT 2003-1); September 10, 2004 (NCSLT 2004-1); October 28, 2004 (NCSLT 2004-2); February 23, 2005 (NCSLT 2005-1); June 9, 2005 (NCSLT 2005-2); October 12, 2005 (NCSLT 2005-3); March 9, 2006 (NCSLT 2006-1); June 9, 2006 (NCSLT 2006-2); June 8, 2006 (NCSLT 2006-3); December 7, 2006 (NCSLT 2006-4); March 8, 2007 (NCSLT 2007-1); June 14, 2007 (NCSLT 2007-2); September 20, 2007 (NCSLT 2007-3); and September 20, 2007 (NCSLT 2007-4).
- b. “Administrator” means the Administrator, as defined in the Trust Indenture, providing certain duties of the Trusts pursuant to the Administration Agreements.
- c. “Affected Consumers” includes Consumers who are or were subject to a Collections Lawsuit filed by Defendants’ agents on behalf of Defendants on or after November 1, 2012 to collect a Debt where (a) the documentation necessary to prove the existence of the Debt does not exist or cannot be located by Defendants; (b) the documentation necessary to prove Trust ownership of the Debt does not exist or cannot be located by Defendants; or (c) the lawsuit was time-barred.
- d. “Affiant” means any signatory to an Affidavit, other than one signing solely as a notary or witness to the act of signing, signing in his or her capacity as an employee or agent of Defendants,

including employees or agents of Defendants' Servicers or Subservicers.

- e. "Affidavit" means any sworn statement filed with a court in connection with litigation to collect on a Debt.
- f. "Board" means the registered owner of a majority of the beneficial interest in each of the Trusts.
- g. "Clearly and Prominently" means
 - i. as to written information: written in a type size and location sufficient for an ordinary consumer to read and comprehend it and disclosed in a manner that would be easily recognizable and understandable in language and syntax to an ordinary consumer; if the information is contained in a multi-page print document, the disclosure appears on the first page.
 - ii. as to information presented orally: spoken and disclosed in a volume, cadence, and syntax sufficient for an ordinary consumer to hear and comprehend.
- h. "Collections Lawsuits" means attempts by Defendants' Servicers on behalf of Defendants (or a third party acting on their behalf for an account owned or alleged to be owned by Defendants) through judicial processes in the United States of America, to collect or establish a Consumer's liability for a Debt.
- i. "Consumer" means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any Debt.

- j. “Debt” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a Consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.
- k. “Effective Date” means the date on which the Order is entered on the docket by the Court.
- l. “Enforcement Director” means the Assistant Director of the Office of Enforcement for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or his or her delegate.
- m. “Primary Servicer” means the Servicer servicing student loans for Defendants under the Amended and Restated Private Student Loan Servicing Agreement dated September 28, 2006.
- n. “Related Consumer Action” means a private action by or on behalf of one or more Consumers or an enforcement action by another governmental agency brought against Defendants based on substantially the same facts as described in the Complaint.
- o. “Relevant Period” includes the period from November 1, 2012 to the Effective Date.
- p. “Defendants” means any or all of the fifteen (15) Delaware statutory trusts referred to as the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (“NCSLTs” or “the Trusts,” which are the National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, NCSLT 2003-1, NCSLT 2004-1, NCSLT

2004-2, NCSLT 2005-1, NCSLT 2005-2, NCSLT 2005-3, NCSLT 2006-1, NCSLT 2006-2, NCSLT 2006-3, NCSLT 2006-4, NCSLT 2007-1, NCSLT 2007-2, NCSLT 2007-3, and NCSLT 2007-4) and their successors and assigns.

- q. “Servicer” (or “Trusts’ Servicer”) means any Servicer, Primary Servicer, Subservicer, Special Servicer, Administrator, and any other individual or entity acting on behalf of Defendants with respect to the servicing of the student loans owned by Defendants, whether retained directly by Defendants or retained by an individual or entity acting on behalf of Defendants.
- r. “Servicing Agreement” means any Servicing Agreement that meets the definition of Servicing Agreement in each Trust’s Indenture.
- s. “Special Servicer” means the Servicer providing services to the Trusts with respect to defaulted and delinquent student loans under the Special Servicing Agreements dated March 1, 2009 and May 1, 2009 (the “Special Servicing Agreements”).
- t. “Subservicer” means any service provider that was retained by, and contracted with, directly or indirectly, the Special Servicer, as an agent of the Special Servicer, to provide services, including default prevention, and collection services, including but not limited to litigation, with respect to the servicing of the student loans owned by Defendants.
- u. “The Trust Agreements” are the Trust Agreements creating each of the Trusts.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that:

I. Conduct Requirements

8. Defendants must provide all Defendants' Servicers that are engaged in the servicing or collection of Debts with actual notice of this Order within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date.
9. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Order, including but not limited to all of Defendants' Servicers, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not violate sections 1031 and 1036 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536, and must take the following affirmative actions:
 - a. Defendants shall take all actions necessary to comply with the terms of the Order, including but not limited to ensuring that all of Defendants' Servicers acting as Defendants' agents comply with the terms of the Order.
 - b. Defendants must require that any of Defendants' Servicers or other agents retained by Defendants in connection with servicing or collection of student loans (1) agree to abide by the terms and conditions of the Order and (2) require any agents that Defendants' Servicers hire in connection with servicing or collection of student loans to abide by the terms and conditions of the Order.
 - c. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Order, including but not limited to all of Defendants' Servicers, whether acting directly or

indirectly, may not initiate a Collections Lawsuit to collect Debt unless they possess:

- i. the documentation necessary to prove that a Trust owns the loan, including but not limited to, documentation reflecting the complete chain of assignment from the Debt's originator to the specific Trust claiming ownership; and
 - ii. a document signed by the Consumer, such as a promissory note, evidencing the agreement to pay the loan forming the basis of the Debt.
- d. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Order, including but not limited to all of Defendants' Servicers, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not initiate a Collections Lawsuit to collect on a loan for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired.
- e. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Order, including but not limited to all of Defendants' Servicers, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not collect any Debt through Collections Lawsuits that Defendants or their agents have any reason to believe may be unenforceable.
- f. Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them, who receive actual notice of this Order, including but not limited to all of Defendants' Servicers, whether acting

directly or indirectly, are permanently restrained and prohibited, in connection with the collection of a Debt, from submitting any

Affidavit:

- i. containing an inaccurate statement;
- ii. in which the Affiant represents, expressly or by implication, that the Affiant is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer's education loan records or the maintenance of those records when that is not the case;
- iii. in which the Affiant represents, expressly or by implication, that the Affiant has personal knowledge of the Consumer's Debt when that is not the case;
- iv. in which the Affiant represents, expressly or by implication, that the Affiant has personal knowledge of the loan's chain of assignment or ownership when that is not the case;
- v. in which the Affiant represents, expressly or by implication, that the Affiant has personal knowledge of the documents relating to the loan's chain of assignment or ownership when that is not the case;
- vi. representing, expressly or by implication, that the Affidavit has been properly notarized if the Affidavit was not executed in the presence of a notary or if the notarization was otherwise not compliant with applicable notary laws; or
- vii. in which the Affiant represents, expressly or by implication, that any documents or records concerning the Debt that

forms the basis of the Collections Lawsuit have been reviewed by the Affiant when that is not the case.

10. Defendants are permanently restrained and prohibited from reselling Debt that is time-barred or for which Defendants lack the necessary documentation required by Paragraph 9(c) without obtaining the written agreement of the purchaser to comply with this Order.
11. Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them, who receive actual notice of this Order, including but not limited to all of Defendants' Servicers, whether acting directly or indirectly, are permanently restrained and prohibited from, in connection with the collection of a Debt, providing any testimony in a Collections Lawsuit that contains any misrepresentations, including false statements that the witness:
 - a. is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer's education loan records or the maintenance of those records;
 - b. has personal knowledge of the Consumer's Debt;
 - c. has personal knowledge of the loan's chain of assignment or ownership; or
 - d. has personal knowledge of the documents relating to the loan's chain of assignment or ownership.
12. If Defendants determine that any of their agents, including but not limited to all of Defendants' Servicers, are on behalf of Defendants engaging in any conduct prohibited by this Order, including but not limited to Paragraphs

9 and 11 of this Order, Defendants promptly will take the necessary steps to ensure that their agents cease any and all practices that violate this Order.

13. Within thirty (30) days of making any determination described in Paragraph 12, Defendants must submit to the Enforcement Director a report detailing (1) the practices that violate the Order, (2) the specific agents engaged in the practices in question, and (3) a plan to ensure that the practices cease and to remediate any harm resulting from the practices.
14. With regard to pending Collections Lawsuits in which Defendants, through actions taken by Defendants' Servicers acting on behalf of Defendants, have filed an Affidavit that contains any misrepresentations—including but not limited to false statements that the Affiant (1) is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer's education loan records or the maintenance of those records, (2) has personal knowledge of the Consumer's indebtedness, (3) has personal knowledge of the loan's chain of assignment or ownership, (4) has personal knowledge about the maintenance of documents relating to the loan's chain of assignment or ownership, or (5) has attached as an exhibit a true and correct copy of a document—Defendants must either withdraw the pending Collections Lawsuit or ensure that the Affidavit is withdrawn. Defendants must instruct their attorneys, Defendants' Servicers, and their agents to either withdraw the pending Collections Lawsuit or notify the court of the following in writing while simultaneously providing the court with a copy

of the Order entered into between the Bureau and Defendants: “Plaintiff withdraws the affidavit of [insert name of affiant] pursuant to an Order entered into by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts.”

15. With regard to concluded Collections Lawsuits in which Defendants, through actions of Defendants’ Servicers acting on behalf of Defendants, filed with a court or in arbitration an Affidavit that contained any misrepresentations—including but not limited to false statements that the Affiant (1) is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer’s education loan records or the maintenance of those records, (2) has personal knowledge of the Consumer’s indebtedness, (3) has personal knowledge of the loan’s chain of assignment or ownership, (4) has personal knowledge about the maintenance of documents relating to the loan’s chain of assignment or ownership, or (5) has attached as an exhibit a true and correct copy of a document—Defendants must instruct their attorneys, the Defendants’ Servicers, and their agents to cease post-judgment enforcement activities and will seek, and will instruct their agents to seek, to remove, withdraw, or terminate any active wage garnishment, bank levies, and similar means of enforcing those judgments or settlements as well as cease accepting settlement payments related to any such concluded Collections Lawsuits.
16. With regard to servicing of Debt owned by Defendants, Defendants shall within ten (10) days of the Effective Date (1) direct the Primary Servicer to cease transferring any Debt to the Special Servicer and any Subservicer and

instead retain possession of the Debt pending approval and implementation of the Compliance Plan provided for in Section III; (2) direct the Special Servicer and any Subservicer to suspend further collection efforts on all Debt owned by Defendants pending approval and implementation of the Compliance Plan provided for in Section III; (3) direct the Special Servicer and any Special Servicer agent to discontinue making outbound call attempts, sending collection letters, providing negative reports to any of consumer reporting agencies the credit bureaus, or other efforts as may be instructed by Defendants and are necessary to effectuate compliance with this Order; (4) direct the Primary Servicer to instruct the Special Servicer and all Subservicers to return to the Primary Servicer all student loans in their portfolio owned by Defendants that are completed and the subject of each monthly Compliance Audit Report described in Paragraph 20; and (5) direct Defendants' Servicers to take any other appropriate actions necessary to effectuate compliance with this Order as instructed by the Defendants.

17. Defendants shall direct (1) the Primary Servicer and Special Servicer to remit all payments from Consumers to an escrow account as designated by Defendants pursuant to Paragraph 18; (2) the Subservicer to remit funds to the Special Servicer and the Special Servicer to remit those payments to the escrow account as designated by Defendants pursuant to Paragraph 18; and (3) the Primary Servicer and Special Servicer to provide an itemized report to the Defendants identifying the payments remitted at the loan level in a format approved by the Defendants.

18. Nothing in this Order shall prohibit Defendants or their Servicers from accepting payments from Consumers made in the regular course on Debt that is not subject to a Collections Lawsuit. All such payments shall be held in escrow until the requirements of Paragraphs 9(c)(1) and (2) are satisfied and Defendants have determined that sufficient loan documentation exists to either retain the payment or refund the amount paid as to be provided for in the Compliance Plan of Section III. Defendants may use funds from the escrow to carry out Trust operations, including payments to noteholders sufficient to avoid events of default under the Indenture Trust, auditors, consultants, accountants, legal counsel, and other necessary professionals.

II. Compliance Audit

19. Within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date, Defendants must secure and retain one or more qualified, independent consultants or auditors with specialized experience in the servicing of student loans, and acceptable to the Enforcement Director, to conduct an independent audit of all of the servicing and collecting conducted by Defendants' Servicers on student loans owned by Defendants from inception of each of the Trusts to the present, using procedures and standards generally acceptable to the student loan-servicing industry. The purposes of the Compliance Audit must be to determine, at a minimum:
 - a. For each and every student loan, whether Defendants, or their agents (including Defendants' Servicers), have or ever had in their possession sufficient loan documentation, including signed

promissory notes and documentation reflecting the complete chain of assignment since the loan's origination, to support the claim that a Debt is currently owed to a Trust, including but not limited to, assignments from the Debt's originator to the Trust claiming ownership and any subsequent assignments by the Trust to a student loan guarantor (such as The Education Resources Institute or its successors);

- b. Whether certain loans owned by Defendants are no longer legally enforceable because the applicable statute of limitations has expired;
- c. Whether Collections Lawsuits have been filed on any loans for which sufficient documentation, including signed promissory notes and documentation reflecting the complete chain of assignment from the Debt's originator to the Collections Lawsuit's named plaintiff, is not in the possession of the Collections Lawsuit's named plaintiff, or a Defendants' Servicer acting on behalf of the named plaintiff, to prove the existence of the Debt owed to the Trust in question, or where the applicable statute of limitations has expired;
- d. Whether judgments were obtained in Collections Lawsuits described in Paragraph 19(c), the identity of Consumers from whom the Defendants obtained payments in response to those Collections Lawsuits, and the specific amounts collected from these Consumers;

- e. Whether any student loans were disbursed to the Consumers after the loans allegedly were transferred to the Defendants;
 - f. Whether any of Defendants' agents, including but not limited to any of Defendants' Servicers, have failed to comply with any Federal consumer financial law or any of the Servicers' Servicing Guidelines; and
 - g. Whether any of Defendants' agents, including but not limited to any of Defendants' Servicers, are or have engaged in any practices on behalf of Defendants after the Effective Date that violate this Order.
20. Within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the Effective Date and each thirty (30) days thereafter until finished, the independent consultant(s) must provide a written report to Defendants detailing the findings of the audit (the "Compliance Audit Reports"). The Compliance Audit Report with respect to additional Affected Consumers shall be completed within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the Effective Date, and the remainder of the Compliance Audit Reports within three hundred and sixty (360) days of the Effective Date. The Compliance Audit Report shall include the auditors' findings, conclusions, and a description of its methodology.
21. Defendants must provide the Compliance Audit Reports to the Enforcement Director within fourteen (14) days of receipt by Defendants.
22. Within thirty (30) days of receiving the final Compliance Audit Report identified in Paragraph 20, Defendants must submit to the Enforcement

Director for review and non-objection an amendment to the Compliance Plan (“Amended Compliance Plan”) described in Section III to:

- a. ensure the withdrawal and dismissal without prejudice of any pending Collections Lawsuits identified in Paragraph 19(c);
- b. ensure that Defendants and their agents, including but not limited to any of Defendants’ Servicers, will not take any steps to initiate collections or furnish negative reports to consumer reporting agencies, on loans identified in Paragraph 19(a), or accept payments on any defaulted Debts, unless and until Defendants first verify the existence of the documentation referenced in that subparagraph in order to prove the existence of the Debt and the identity of the current owner;
- c. ensure that Defendants and their agents, including but not limited to any of Defendants’ Servicers, will not take any steps to collect Debts by any means on any loans identified in Paragraph 19(b) without Clearly and Prominently disclosing to the Consumer as follows:
 - i. For those time-barred debts that generally cannot be included in a consumer report under the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), but can be collected through other means pursuant to applicable state law, Defendants will instruct their agents to include the following statement: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt and how long a debt can appear on your

credit report. Due to the age of this debt, we will not sue you for it or report payment or non-payment of it to a credit bureau.”

- ii. For those time-barred debts that can be collected through other means pursuant to applicable state law, and may be included in a consumer report under the provisions of FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), Defendants will instruct their agents to include the following statement: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for it.”

23. Defendants and their agents are prohibited from making any representation or statement, or from taking any other action that interferes with, detracts from, contradicts, or otherwise undermines the disclosures required in Paragraph 22.
24. Defendants will be deemed to have complied with the disclosure requirements of Paragraph 22 if Defendants or their agents makes a disclosure to Consumers in a specific jurisdiction that (1) is required by the laws or regulations of that jurisdiction, (2) complies with those laws or regulations, and (3) is substantially similar to the disclosure required by Paragraph 22.
25. The Enforcement Director will have the discretion to make a determination of non-objection to the Amended Compliance Plan or to direct the Defendants to revise it. If the Enforcement Director directs the Defendants to revise the Amended Compliance Plan, Defendants must

make the requested revisions and resubmit the Amended Compliance Plan to the Enforcement Director within thirty (30) days.

26. After receiving notification that the Enforcement Director has made a determination of non-objection to the Amended Compliance Plan, Defendants must implement and adhere to the steps, recommendations, deadlines, and timeframes outlined in the Amended Compliance Plan.
27. Within thirty (30) days of receiving notification that the Enforcement Director has made a determination of non-objection to the Amended Compliance Plan, Defendants will provide the Amended Compliance Plan and the Compliance Audit Reports to Transworld Systems, Inc. (“TSI”), or, if applicable, to the Defendants’ successor Special Servicer or Subservicer.

III. Compliance Plan

28. Within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the Effective Date, Defendants must submit to the Enforcement Director for review and determination of non-objection a comprehensive compliance plan designed to ensure that Defendants and Defendants’ Servicers acting on their behalf comply with all applicable Federal consumer financial laws and the terms of this Order (“Compliance Plan”). The Compliance Plan must include, at a minimum:
 - a. Detailed steps for addressing each action required by this Order including operations meetings with the Primary Servicer;
 - b. Specific timeframes and deadlines for implementation of the steps described above; and

- c. Comprehensive, written policies and procedures designed to ensure that any agents acting on behalf of the Defendants do not engage in practices in violation of this Order. These policies and procedures must include:
 - i. Detailed steps for addressing each action required of the Defendants or their agents, including but not limited to the Defendants' Servicers, by this Order;
 - ii. Comprehensive, written policies and procedures designed to prevent violations of Federal consumer financial laws and associated risks of harm to Consumers including regular operations meetings with and audits of each Servicer and establishment of procedures to respond to exception requests;
 - iii. An effective employee training program required for all of the agents' employees, including but not limited to Affiants, whose duties include reviewing, drafting, preparing, processing, verification, execution or notarization of Affidavits that includes regular, specific, comprehensive training in Federal consumer financial laws commensurate with individual job functions and duties;
 - iv. Implementation of reasonable and appropriate written policies and procedures to ensure the proper notarization processes for Affidavits, including that notaries place the Affiants under oath and witness their signatures;

- v. Implementation of reasonable and appropriate written policies and procedures to ensure that Affiants verify the accuracy of each statement made in an Affidavit before executing the Affidavit; and
 - vi. Comprehensive, written policies and procedures designed to ensure that any law firms engaged by any agent to collect Debt does not violate any Federal consumer financial laws, which must include, at a minimum:
 - (1) the law firm's duty to maintain adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with Federal consumer financial laws;
 - (2) the law firm's duty to provide adequate training on compliance with all applicable Federal consumer financial laws and the agent's policies and procedures related to Collections Lawsuits;
 - (3) the agent's authority to conduct periodic onsite reviews of the law firm's controls, performance, and information systems related to Collections Lawsuits; and
 - (4) periodic review by the agent of the law firm's controls, performance, and information systems related to Collections Lawsuits.
29. The Enforcement Director will have the discretion to make a determination of non-objection to the Compliance Plan or direct

Defendants to revise it. If the Enforcement Director directs Defendants to revise the Compliance Plan, Defendants must make the revisions and resubmit the Compliance Plan to the Enforcement Director within thirty (30) days.

30. After receiving notification that the Enforcement Director has made a determination of non-objection to the Compliance Plan or any amendments thereto, Defendants must implement and adhere to the steps, recommendations, deadlines, and timeframes outlined in the Compliance Plan.

IV. Role of the Board

31. The Board must review all submissions (including plans, reports, programs, policies, and procedures) required by this Order prior to submission to the Bureau.
32. Although this Order requires Defendants to submit certain documents for the review or non-objection by the Enforcement Director, the Board of Defendants will have the ultimate responsibility for proper and sound management of Defendants and for ensuring that Defendants comply with Federal consumer financial law and this Order.
33. In each instance that this Order requires the Board to ensure adherence to or perform certain obligations of Defendants, the Board must:
 - a. Authorize whatever actions are necessary for Defendants to fully comply with the Order;
 - b. Require timely reporting by Defendants' Servicers to the Board on the status of compliance obligations; and

- c. Require timely and appropriate corrective action to remedy any material non-compliance with any failures to comply with Board directives related to this Section.

V. Order to Pay Redress

34. Within ten (10) days of the Effective Date, the Defendants must reserve or deposit into a segregated deposit account \$3,500,000, for the purpose of providing redress to Affected Consumers as required by this Section.
35. Within one-hundred and twenty (120) days of the Effective Date, the Defendants must submit to the Enforcement Director for review and non-objection a comprehensive written plan for providing redress to the previously identified Affected Consumers consistent with this Order (“Redress Plan”). The Enforcement Director will have the discretion to make a determination of non-objection to the Redress Plan or direct Defendants to revise it. If the Enforcement Director directs Defendants to revise the Redress Plan, Defendants must make the revisions and resubmit the Redress Plan to the Enforcement Director within thirty (30) days. After receiving notification that the Enforcement Director has made a determination of non-objection to the Redress Plan, Defendants must implement and adhere to the steps, recommendations, deadlines, and timeframes outlined in the Redress Plan.
36. The Redress Plan must apply to all Affected Consumers and:
 - a. Specify how Defendants will identify all Affected Consumers;

- b. Provide processes for providing redress covering all Affected Consumers including providing redress for:
 - i. Affected Consumers where the documentation necessary to prove the existence of the Debt did not exist or cannot be located by Defendants;
 - ii. Affected Consumers where the documentation necessary to prove Trust ownership of the Debt did not exist or cannot be located by Defendants; and
 - iii. Affected Consumers who were subject to a Collections Lawsuit outside the applicable statute of limitations.
 - c. Include a description of the following:
 - i. Methods used to compile a list of potential Affected Consumers;
 - ii. Methods used to calculate the amount of redress to be paid to each Affected Consumer;
 - iii. Procedures for issuance and tracking of redress to Affected Consumers; and
 - iv. Procedures for monitoring compliance with the Redress Plan.
37. The Redress Plan, at a minimum, must provide full restitution of all amounts collected since the initiation of the Collections Lawsuit filed against them from:
- a. The approximately 2,700 Affected Consumers identified prior to the Effective Date, who paid approximately \$3,500,000; and

- b. The Affected Consumers identified by the Compliance Audit in Section II.
38. The Redress Plan must describe the process for providing redress for Affected Consumers and must include the following requirements:
- a. A timetable for providing restitution to Affected Consumers identified in Paragraph 37(a) and (b) that provides restitution to each group of Affected Consumers as soon as practicable;
 - b. Defendants must mail a bank check to each Affected Consumer along with a Redress Notification Letter (as defined below);
 - c. Defendants must send the bank check by United States Postal Service first-class mail, address correction service requested, to the Affected Consumer's last known address as maintained by Defendants' records;
 - d. Defendants must make reasonable attempts to obtain a current address for any Affected Consumer whose Redress Notification Letter or redress check is returned for any reason, using the National Change of Address System, and must promptly re-mail all returned letters and redress checks to current addresses, if any; and
 - e. Processes for handling any unclaimed funds.
39. With respect to redress paid to Affected Consumers, the Redress Plan must include:
- a. The form of the letter ("Redress Notification Letter") to be sent notifying Affected Consumers of the redress, which must include language explaining the manner in which the amount of redress

was calculated and a statement that the provision of the refund payment is in accordance with the terms of this Order; and

- b. The form of the envelope that will contain the Redress Notification Letter.
40. Defendants must not include in any envelope containing a “Redress Notification Letter” any materials other than the approved letters and redress checks, unless Defendants have obtained written confirmation from the Enforcement Director that the Bureau does not object to the inclusion of such additional materials.
 41. Within ninety (90) days of completion of the Redress Plan, Defendants must submit a report (“Redress Plan Report”) to the Enforcement Director, which must include a review and assessment from an independent auditor agreed upon by Defendants and the Enforcement Director, on Defendants’ compliance with the terms of the Redress Plan, including:
 - a. The methodology used to determine the population of Affected Consumers;
 - b. The redress amount for each Affected Consumer;
 - c. The total number of Affected Consumers;
 - d. The procedures used to issue and track redress payments;
 - e. The amount, status, and planned disposition of all unclaimed redress payments; and

- f. A description of the work of independent consultants that Defendants have used, if any, to assist and review their execution of the Redress Plan.
42. Defendants must submit an Amended Redress Plan within thirty (30) days of the completion of the Compliance Audit with respect to additional Affected Consumers required by Section II that incorporates the results of that Audit. The amended Redress Plan must contemplate providing full restitution to all additional Affected Consumers identified in the Compliance Audit within 120 days of submission of the Amended Redress Plan.
43. Defendants must provide all of the relief to Consumers required by the Order, regardless of whether the total of such relief exceeds the amount reserved or deposited into a segregated account in this Section.
44. After completing the Redress Plan, if the amount of redress provided to Affected Consumers is less than \$3,500,000, within thirty (30) days of the completion of the Redress Plan, Defendants must pay to the Bureau, by wire transfer to the Bureau or to the Bureau's agent, and according to the Bureau's wiring instructions, the difference between the amount of redress provided to Affected Consumers and \$3,500,000.
45. The Bureau may use these remaining funds to pay additional redress to Affected Consumers. If the Bureau determines, in its sole discretion, that additional redress is wholly or partially impracticable or otherwise inappropriate, or if funds remain after the additional redress is completed, the Bureau will deposit any remaining funds in the U.S. Treasury as

disgorgement. Defendants will have no right to challenge any actions that the Bureau or its representatives may take under this Section.

46. Defendants may not condition the payment of any redress to any Affected Consumer under this Order on that Affected Consumer's waiving any right.
47. With regard to the Debt that has yet to be collected from Affected Consumers for whom Defendants and their agents do not possess or cannot locate the documentation necessary to prove the existence of the Debt or Defendants' ownership of the Debt, Defendants must within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the Effective Date—and for Affected Consumers identified in the Compliance Audit Reports, within thirty (30) days of the completion of the Compliance Audit Reports—instruct that their agents within 90 days:
 - a. Withdraw, dismiss, or terminate all pending Collections Lawsuits filed against Affected Consumers;
 - b. Release or move to vacate all judgments obtained during the Relevant Time Period in connection with these Collections Lawsuits;
 - c. Cease post-judgment enforcement activities and seek to remove, withdraw, or terminate its active wage garnishment, bank levies, and similar means of enforcing those judgments or settlements as well as cease accepting settlement payments related to any Collections Lawsuits;

- d. Refrain from (i) representing to a Consumer or any other person that Defendants are or were owed a Debt, (ii) taking any steps to collect or to seek to collect the Debt in question, (iii) furnishing reports on the Debt in question, except as otherwise required by this Order; and
 - e. Request that the consumer reporting agencies correct any affected collection account or tradeline, which may include amending, deleting, or suppressing the incorrect account or tradeline.
48. With regard to time-barred Debt that has yet to be collected from Affected Consumers, Defendants and their agents will not take any steps to collect Debts by any means without Clearly and Prominently disclosing to the consumer:
- a. For those time-barred debts that generally cannot be included in a consumer report under the provisions of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), but can be collected through other means pursuant to applicable state law, Defendants will instruct their agents to include the following statement: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt and how long a debt can appear on your credit report. Due to the age of this debt, we will not sue you for it or report payment or non-payment of it to a credit bureau.”
 - b. For those time-barred debts that can be collected through other means pursuant to applicable state law, and may be included in a consumer report under the provisions of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), Defendants will instruct their agents to include the

following statement: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for it.”

49. Defendants and their agents are prohibited from making any representation or statement, or from taking any other action that interferes with, detracts from, contradicts, or otherwise undermines the disclosures required in Paragraph 48.
50. Defendants will be deemed to have complied with the disclosure requirements of Paragraph 48 if Defendants or their agents make a disclosure to Consumers in a specific jurisdiction that (1) is required by the laws or regulations of that jurisdiction, (2) complies with those laws or regulations, and (3) is substantially similar to the disclosure required by Paragraph 48.

VI. Order to Pay Disgorgement

51. Defendants shall pay \$7,800,000 as disgorgement for the proceeds they received from the unlawful practices related to the filing of Collections Lawsuits during the Relevant Period.
52. Within ten (10) days of the Effective Date, Defendants shall pay the above amount in the form of a wire transfer to the Bureau or such agent as the Bureau may direct, and in accordance with wiring instructions to be provided by counsel for the CFPB. The Bureau will then transfer the payment to the United States Treasury as disgorgement.
53. In the event of any default on Defendants’ obligations to make payment under this Order, interest, computed under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, as amended,

will accrue on any outstanding amounts not paid from the date of default to the date of payment, and will immediately become due and payable.

VII. Order to Pay Civil Money Penalty

54. Under section 1055(c) of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c), by reason of the violations of law described in the Complaint, and taking into account the factors in 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3), the Defendants must pay a civil money penalty of \$7,800,000 to the Bureau.
55. Within ten (10) days of the Effective Date, Defendants must pay the civil money penalty by wire transfer to the Bureau or to the Bureau's agent in compliance with the Bureau's wiring instructions.
56. The civil money penalty paid under this Order will be deposited in the Civil Penalty Fund of the Bureau as required by section 1017(d) of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d).
57. Defendants must treat the civil money penalty paid under this Order as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes. Regardless of how the Bureau ultimately uses those funds, Defendants may not:
 - a. Claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction, tax credit, or any other tax benefit for any civil money penalty paid under this Order; or
 - b. Seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made under any insurance policy, with regard to any civil money penalty paid under this Order.
58. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil money penalty in any Related Consumer Action, Defendants may not argue that Defendants are entitled

to, nor may Defendants benefit by, any offset or reduction of any compensatory monetary remedies imposed in the Related Consumer Action because of the civil money penalty paid in this action or because of any payment that the Bureau makes from the Civil Penalty Fund (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Consumer Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendants must, within thirty (30) days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Enforcement Director, and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the U.S. Treasury. Such a payment will not be considered an additional civil money penalty and will not change the amount of the civil money penalty imposed in this action.

VIII. Additional Monetary Provisions

59. In the event of any default on Defendants’ obligations to make payment under this Order, interest, computed under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, as amended, will accrue on any outstanding amounts not paid from the date of default to the date of payment and will immediately become due and payable.
60. Defendants must relinquish all dominion, control, and title to the funds paid to the fullest extent permitted by law and no part of the funds may be returned to Defendants.
61. Under 31 U.S.C. § 7701, Defendants, unless they already have done so, must furnish to the Bureau their taxpayer identifying numbers, which may be used for purposes of collecting and reporting on any delinquent amount arising out of this Order.
62. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of a final judgment, consent order, or settlement in a Related Consumer Action, Defendants must notify the

Enforcement Director of the final judgment, consent order, or settlement in writing. That notification must indicate the amount of redress, if any, that Defendants paid or is required to pay to Consumers and describe the Consumers or classes of Consumers to whom that redress has been or will be paid.

IX. Reporting Requirements

63. Defendants must notify the Enforcement Director of any development that may affect compliance obligations arising under this Order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor company; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this Order; the filing of any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding by or against Defendants; or a change in Defendants' name or address. Defendants must provide this notice, if practicable, at least thirty (30) days before the development but in any case no later than fourteen (14) days after the development.
64. Within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the Effective Date, and again one year after the Effective Date, Defendants must submit to the Enforcement Director an accurate written compliance progress report ("Compliance Report") that has been approved by the Board, which, at a minimum:
 - a. Describes in detail the manner and form in which Defendants have complied with this Order; and

- b. Attaches a copy of each Order Acknowledgment obtained under Section X, unless previously submitted to the Enforcement Director.

X. Order Distribution and Acknowledgment

65. Within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date, Defendants must deliver a copy of this Order to each of their board members or owners as well as to any managers, employees, Servicers, or other agents and representatives who have responsibilities related to the subject matter of the Order.
66. For five (5) years from the Effective Date, Defendants must deliver a copy of this Order to any business entity resulting from any change in structure referred to in Section IX, any future board members, executive officers, or owners, as well as to any managers, employees, Servicers, or other agents and representatives who will have responsibilities related to the subject matter of the Order before they assume their responsibilities.
67. Defendants must secure a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of a copy of this Order, ensuring that any electronic signatures comply with the requirements of the E-Sign Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–31, within thirty (30) days of delivery, from all persons receiving a copy of this Order under this Section.

XI. Recordkeeping

68. Defendants must create, or if already created, must retain for at least five (5) years from the Effective Date, the following business records:
 - a. All documents and records necessary to demonstrate full compliance with each provision of this Order, including all submissions to the Bureau.

- b. All documents and records pertaining to the Redress Plan, described in Section V.
69. Defendants must retain the documents identified in Paragraph 68 for the duration of the Order.
70. Defendants must make the documents identified in Paragraph 68 available to the Bureau upon the Bureau's request.

XII. Notices

71. Unless otherwise directed in writing by the Enforcement Director, Defendants must provide all submissions, requests, communications, or other documents relating to this Order in writing, with the subject line, "*In re* [name of Respondent], File No. Year-CFPB- ,” and send them either:

- a. By overnight courier (not the U.S. Postal Service), as follows:

Assistant Director for Enforcement
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
ATTENTION: Office of Enforcement
1625 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20006; or

- b. By first-class mail to the below address and contemporaneously by email to Enforcement_Compliance@cfpb.gov:

Assistant Director for Enforcement
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
ATTENTION: Office of Enforcement
1700 G Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20552

XIII. Cooperation with the Bureau

72. Defendants must cooperate fully with the Bureau in this matter and in any investigation related to or associated with the conduct described in the Complaint. Defendants must provide truthful and complete information,

evidence, and testimony, and Defendants must cause their officers, employees, representatives, or agents to appear for interviews, discovery, hearings, trials, and any other proceedings that the Bureau may reasonably request upon five (5) days' written notice, or other reasonable notice, at such places and times as the Bureau may designate, without the service of compulsory process.

XIV. Compliance Monitoring

73. Within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a written request from the Bureau, Defendants must submit additional Compliance Reports or other requested information, which must be made under penalty of perjury; provide sworn testimony; or produce documents.
74. Defendants must permit Bureau representatives to interview any employee or other person affiliated with Defendants who has agreed to such an interview. The person interviewed may have counsel present.
75. Nothing in this Order will limit the Bureau's lawful use of civil investigative demands under 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6 or other compulsory process.

XV. Retention of Jurisdiction

76. The Court will retain jurisdiction of this matter for purposes of construction, modification, and enforcement of this Order.
77. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 76, any time limits for performance fixed by this Order may be extended by mutual written agreement of the parties and without further Court approval. Additionally, details related to administration of §§ IX through XIV of this Order may be

modified by written agreement of the parties and without further Court approval. Any other modifications to this Order may be made only upon approval of the Court, upon motion by any party.

XVI. Administrative Provisions

78. The Bureau releases and discharges Defendants from all potential liability for law violations that the Bureau has or might have asserted based on the practices described in the Complaint, to the extent such practices occurred before the Effective Date and the Bureau knows about them as of the Effective Date. The Bureau may use the practices described in this Order in future enforcement actions against Defendants and their affiliates, including, without limitation, to establish a pattern or practice of violations or the continuation of a pattern or practice of violations or to calculate the amount of any penalty. This release does not preclude or affect any right of the Bureau to determine and ensure compliance with the Order or to seek penalties for any violations of the Order.
79. Should Defendants seek to transfer or assign all or part of its operations that are subject to this Order, Defendants must, as a condition of sale, obtain the written agreement of the transferee or assignee to comply with all applicable provisions of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Consented and agreed to:

FOR THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU:

ANTHONY ALEXIS
Enforcement Director

Deborah Morris
Deputy Enforcement Director

/s/ Carolyn Hahn
Carolyn Hahn
(E-mail: Carolyn.Hahn@cfpb.gov)
(Phone: 202-435-7250)
Edward Keefe
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

FOR THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUSTS

Defendants National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts
Waive service and answer of the Complaint and
Consent to entry of this Consent Judgment.

/s/ Daniel M. Silver

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Exhibit B

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING File
2017-CFPB-0018

In the Matter of:

TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

CONSENT ORDER

I.

Overview

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau) has reviewed the debt collections litigation practices of the Attorney Network business unit of Transworld Systems, Inc. (“TSI”) (“Respondent”), the agent and Service Provider for fifteen (15) Delaware statutory trusts referred to as the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (“NCSLTs”, or “the Trusts”, which are the National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, NCSLT 2003-1, NCSLT 2004-1, NCSLT 2004-2, NCSLT 2005-1, NCSLT 2005-2, NCSLT 2005-3, NCSLT 2006-1, NCSLT 2006-2, NCSLT 2006-3, NCSLT 2006-4, NCSLT 2007-1, NCSLT 2007-2, NCSLT 2007-3, and NCSLT 2007-4), and has identified violations of sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA). Under sections 1053 and 1055 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563, 5565, the Bureau issues this Consent Order (Consent Order).

To collect on defaulted private student loans, Law Firms engaged by Respondent’s Attorney Network business unit filed debt Collections Lawsuits in state

courts across the country on behalf of the Trusts. In support of many of these lawsuits, Respondent executed affidavits that falsely claimed personal knowledge of the account records and the consumer's debt, and in many cases, personal knowledge of the chain of assignments establishing ownership of the loans. In addition, since November 1, 2014, Law Firms hired by Respondent filed hundreds of debt Collections Lawsuits without the documentation necessary to prove Trust ownership of the loans.

II

Jurisdiction

1. The Bureau has jurisdiction over this matter under sections 1053 and 1055 of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563, 5565.

III

Stipulation

2. Respondent has executed a "Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a Consent Order," dated September 14, 2017 (Stipulation), which is incorporated by reference and is accepted by the Bureau. By this Stipulation, Respondent has consented to the issuance of this Consent Order by the Bureau under sections 1053 and 1055 of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563, 5565, without admitting or denying any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law, except that Respondent admits the facts necessary to establish the Bureau's jurisdiction over Respondent and the subject matter of this action.

IV

Definitions

3. The following definitions apply to this Consent Order:
- a. "Affiant" means any signatory to an Affidavit, signing in his or her capacity as an employee or agent of Respondent, but excluding one signing solely as a notary or witness to the act of signing.
 - b. "Affidavit" means any sworn statement filed with a court in connection with a Collections Lawsuit.
 - c. "Board" means TSI's duly elected and acting Board of Directors.
 - d. "Clearly and Prominently" means:
 - i. as to written information: written in a type size and location sufficient for an ordinary consumer to read and comprehend it, and disclosed in a manner that would be easily recognizable and understandable in language and syntax to an ordinary consumer; if the information is contained in a multi-page print document, the disclosure appears on the first page.
 - ii. as to information presented orally: spoken and disclosed in a volume, cadence, and syntax sufficient for an ordinary consumer to hear and comprehend.
 - e. "Collections Lawsuits" means attempts by a Law Firm engaged by Respondent's Attorney Network business unit, for an account owned or alleged to be owned by a Trust, through judicial processes in the United States of America, to collect or establish a Consumer's liability for a Debt.
 - f. "Consumer" means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any Debt.

- g. "Debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation of a Consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.
- h. "Effective Date" means the date on which the Consent Order is issued.
- i. "Enforcement Director" means the Assistant Director of the Office of Enforcement for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or his/her delegate.
- j. "Law Firm" means a law firm engaged by Respondent's Attorney Network business unit to collect student loan Debt on behalf of the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts.
- k. "Regional Director" means the Regional Director for the Northeast Region for the Office of Supervision for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or his/her delegate.
- l. "Related Consumer Action" means a private action by or on behalf of one or more consumers or an enforcement action by another governmental agency brought against Respondent based on substantially the same facts as described in Section V of this Consent Order.
- m. "Relevant Period" includes the period from November 1, 2014 to April 25, 2016.
- n. "Respondent" means Transworld Systems, Inc., and its successors and assigns.

- o. "Service Providers" means any service provider, as defined in section 1002(26) of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. § 5481, that provides or provided services with respect to the servicing of the student loans owned by a NCSLT.

V.

Bureau Findings and Conclusions

The Bureau finds the following:

4. The National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts ("NCSLT's" or "the Trusts") comprise fifteen (15) Delaware statutory trusts created between 2001 and 2007. The basic purpose of each Trust is to acquire a pool of student loans, enter into the so-called trust-related agreements, and provide for the administration of the Trusts and the servicing of student loans.
5. The Trusts do not have any employees and all actions taken by the Trusts in connection with loan servicing and collecting Debt are carried out by third parties.
6. Debt-collection activities on behalf of the Trusts are carried out by the successor special servicer's sub-servicer pursuant to servicing agreements with the successor special servicer.
7. Sub-servicers that executed and notarized the deceptive affidavits did so as Service Providers and agents of the Trusts.
8. Law Firms that filed lawsuits on behalf of the Trusts did so as Service Providers and agents of the Trusts.

9. Respondent Transworld Systems, Inc. (TSI) is incorporated under the laws of the State of California and maintains a principal place of business in Ft. Washington, Pennsylvania.
10. TSI maintains an office in Peachtree Corners, Georgia, where its employees execute and notarize affidavits for Collections Lawsuits brought on behalf of the Trusts.
11. A national network of Law Firms engaged by Respondent file and prosecute Collections Lawsuits on behalf of the Trusts in courts across the country.
12. TSI has operated as the successor sub-servicer to the successor special servicer of the Trusts since November 1, 2014.
13. TSI is a "covered person" under 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) because it is engaged in the collection of debt and is a Service Provider. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(x), (26).
14. TSI is an agent and Service Provider of the Trusts.

FALSE AND MISLEADING AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONY

15. In connection with collecting or attempting to collect Debt from Consumers, between November 1, 2014 and April 25, 2016, Law Firms hired by Respondent on behalf of the Trusts initiated 37,689 Collections Lawsuits in courts across the country on behalf of the Trusts.
16. In support of the Collections Lawsuits, Law Firms submitted Affidavits executed by Respondent and documents in support of the Trusts' claims that Consumers owed Debts to a Trust.
17. Respondent executed and notarized Affidavits—often with attached exhibits—that were used by Law Firms in many of the Collections Lawsuits

brought on behalf of the Trusts between November 1, 2014 and April 25, 2016.

18. In these Affidavits, the Affiants swore that they had personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the Debt. In fact, in numerous instances, Affiants lacked personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the Debt when they executed the Affidavits.
19. The Affiants also asserted that they were authorized and competent to testify about the Consumers' Debts through review of and "personal knowledge" of the business records, including electronic data in their possession. In fact, in certain instances, Affiants lacked personal knowledge of the business records, including the electronic data, showing that Consumers owed Debts to the Trusts. Affiants were instructed to review certain data on a computer screen as part of an effort to verify some information in the Affidavits about the Debts. Affiants, however, did not always know the source of the data on that screen, how the data was obtained or maintained, whether it was accurate, or whether that data meant that the Debt was in fact owed to the Trusts.
20. Each Affiant also swore that he/she had "personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of Plaintiff [the Trust] and the practices and procedures Plaintiff requires of its loan servicers and other agents." In fact, certain Affiants lacked personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of the Trusts and the practices and procedures the Trusts required of its loan servicers and other agents.

21. In many Affidavits, the Affiants also stated that "I have reviewed the chain of title records as business records" regarding the relevant account. In some cases, Affiants did not possess the chain of title records but reviewed "chain of title" records that were found online on a government portal maintained by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In numerous instances, Affiants did not review the chain of title records prior to executing the Affidavits.
22. In certain Affidavits, the Affiants asserted that they had personal knowledge that the loans were transferred, sold, and assigned to the plaintiff Trusts on dates certain. In fact, in numerous instances, Affiants lacked personal knowledge of the chain of assignment records necessary to prove that the relevant Trust owned the subject loans.
23. In some instances, certain Affiants complained to supervisors that they did not have personal knowledge of the representations made in the Affidavits. These affiants continued to execute Affidavits, however, for fear of losing their jobs.
24. Affiants also provided live testimony in court, purportedly based on personal knowledge, similar to the statements made in the Affidavits as described in Paragraphs 18-22.

**FILING LAWSUITS WITHOUT THE INTENT OR ABILITY TO
PROVE THE CLAIMS, IF CONTESTED**

25. From November 1, 2014 to April 25, 2016, on behalf of the Trusts, Law Firms filed numerous Collections Lawsuits against Consumers even though

the complete documentation needed to prove that the Trusts owned the loans did not exist.

26. In these lawsuits, documentation of a complete chain of assignment evidencing that the subject loan was transferred to and owned by the Trust was lacking.
27. In addition, Law Firms hired by Respondent on behalf of the Trusts filed numerous Collections Lawsuits where the loans in question were disbursed to the Consumers after the loans allegedly were transferred to the Trusts according to the chain of assignment documents.
28. On numerous occasions, Law Firms hired by Respondent filed Collections Lawsuits even though the promissory note to prove that a Debt was owed did not exist.
29. For each Collections Lawsuit described in Paragraphs 25-28, Law Firms hired by Respondent could not prove that a Debt was owed to the Trusts, if contested.

Violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act

30. Covered persons are prohibited from engaging "in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice" in violation of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B).
31. An act or practice is deceptive under the CFPB if it involves a material representation or omission that misleads, or is likely to mislead, a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.
32. An act or practice is unfair if "(A) the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by

consumers; and (B) such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition." 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1).

FALSE AND MISLEADING COLLECTION AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONY

33. In numerous instances, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect Debt from Consumers, Respondent executed Affidavits that were used by Law Firms with many of the Collections Lawsuits filed by Law Firms on behalf of the Trusts in courts across the country, and in live testimony, Respondent represented, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, that:
 - a. Affiants had personal knowledge of the account records and the Debt;
 - b. Affiants had personal knowledge of the chain of assignment records evidencing Trust ownership of the subject loan; and
 - c. Affiants had personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of the Trusts and all prior servicers.
34. In fact, as described in Paragraphs 18 to 24, in numerous instances, these representations were either false or the Affiant did not have a basis for making the representation.
35. The representations are material because they are likely to affect a Consumer's choice or conduct regarding how to respond to a Collections Lawsuit and are likely to mislead a Consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.

36. Thus, representations by Respondent, as described in Paragraphs 18-24, constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1)(B) of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B).

**FILING LAWSUITS WITHOUT THE INTENT OR ABILITY TO PROVE
THE CLAIMS, IF CONTESTED**

37. In numerous instances, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect Debt from Consumers, Respondent, acting through the Law Firms hired by Respondent on behalf of the Trusts, represented, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, that it could be proven in the Collections Lawsuits that the Trusts owned the loans in question and that the Consumers in question owed Debts to the Trusts, if contested.
38. In fact, in numerous instances, Respondent lacked the complete chain of assignment documentation needed to prove Trust ownership of the subject loans and the promissory note needed to prove the existence of certain loans.
39. The representations are material because they are likely to affect a Consumer's choice or conduct regarding how to respond to a lawsuit and are likely to mislead a Consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.
40. Thus, Respondent's representations, as described in Paragraphs 25-29, constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1)(B) of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B).
41. In addition, Respondent's acts and practices, caused or were likely to cause substantial injuries to consumers.

42. The injuries to consumers included, but were not limited to, all payments made, including garnishments of wages and bank accounts, to settle Debts not enforceable.
43. The injuries to consumers were not reasonably avoidable by consumers and were not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.
44. Thus, Respondent's conduct, as described in Paragraph 25-29, constitutes unfair acts or practices in violation of sections 1031(c) and 1036(a)(1)(B) of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c)(1), 5536(a)(1)(B).

ORDER

VI

Conduct Provisions

IT IS ORDERED, under sections 1053 and 1055 of the CFPA, that:

45. Respondent and its officers, Service Providers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Consent Order, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not violate sections 1031 and 1036 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536, and must take the following affirmative actions:
 - a. Respondent shall take all actions necessary to comply with the terms of the Consent Order.
 - b. Respondent must require that any Law Firm it retains in connection with the collection of student loans owned by the Trusts agree to abide by the terms and conditions of the Consent Order.
 - c. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, Respondent must identify all Collections Lawsuits that were filed between November 1,

2014 and the Effective Date and that are missing the documentation described in subsection (f)(i) and (ii) of this Paragraph.

- d. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, Respondent must identify all Collections Lawsuits that were filed seeking Debt outside the statute of limitations and provide this information to the successor special servicer or any other Service Provider of the Trusts.
- e. Within one-hundred twenty (120) days of the Effective Date, Respondent must provide to the successor special servicer and to the Bureau for each Consumer named in the suits identified in Paragraph 45c and 45d: the Consumer's name, all available contact information for the Consumer (including information in the possession of the attorneys who filed the suit), and the total amount of all payments made by the Consumer on or after the date on which the suit was filed.
- f. Respondent and its officers, agents, Service Providers, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Consent Order, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not initiate a Collections Lawsuit to collect Debt unless Respondent possesses:
 - i. the documentation necessary to prove that a Trust owns the loan, including but not limited to, documentation reflecting the complete chain of assignment from the Debt's originator to the specific Trust claiming ownership; and
 - ii. a document signed by the Consumer, such as a promissory note, evidencing the agreement to pay the loan forming the basis of the Debt.

- g. Respondent and its officers, agents, Service Providers, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Consent Order, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not cause Law Firms hired by Respondent on behalf of the Trusts to initiate a Collections Lawsuit to collect on a loan for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired.
- h. Respondent shall establish written policies requiring Law Firms to confirm that the applicable statute of limitations has not expired at the time of the filing of the Collections Lawsuit;
- i. Respondent shall require Law Firms to provide a quarterly report to Respondent that includes, for each Collections Lawsuit, any data relevant to determining the applicable statute of limitations, such as date of lawsuit, date of default, and date of last payment, as well as identifies any lawsuits in which a consumer alleges in his pleadings that the lawsuit was filed outside the statute of limitations.
- j. Respondent shall not collect any Debt through a Collections Lawsuit that Respondent knows or learns was filed outside the statute of limitations, and if any such cases are pending, Respondent shall seek the immediate withdrawal or dismissal of the lawsuit.
- k. Respondent and its officers, agents, Service Providers, servants, employees, and attorneys who have actual notice of this Consent Order, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not cause Law Firms hired by Respondent on behalf of the Trusts to collect any Debt through

Collections Lawsuits that Respondent or its agents have any reason to believe may be unenforceable.

- l. Respondent, its officers, agents, Service Providers, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them, who receive actual notice of this Consent Order, whether acting directly or indirectly, are permanently restrained and prohibited from, in connection with the collection of a Debt, executing any Affidavit containing any misrepresentations, including false statements that:
 - i. the Affiant is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer's education loan records or the maintenance of those records;
 - ii. the Affiant has personal knowledge of the Consumer's debt;
 - iii. the Affiant has personal knowledge of the loan's chain of assignment or ownership;
 - iv. the Affiant has personal knowledge of the documents relating to the loan's chain of assignment or ownership;
 - v. the Affidavit has been properly notarized if the Affidavit was not executed in the presence of a notary or if the notarization was otherwise not compliant with applicable notary laws; or
 - vi. certain documents or records concerning the Debt forming the basis of the Collections Lawsuit have been reviewed by the Affiant.
46. Respondent, its officers, agents, Service Providers, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any

of them, who receive actual notice of this Consent Order, whether acting directly or indirectly, are permanently restrained and prohibited from, in connection with the collection of a Debt, providing any testimony that contains any misrepresentations, including false statements that the witness:

- a. is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer's education loan records or the maintenance of those records;
 - b. has personal knowledge of the Consumer's debt;
 - c. has personal knowledge of the loan's chain of assignment or ownership; or
 - d. has personal knowledge of the documents relating to the loan's chain of assignment or ownership.
47. If Respondent determines that it engages in any conduct prohibited by this Order, including but not limited to Paragraphs 45-46 of this Order, Respondent promptly will take the necessary steps to ensure that it ceases any and all practices that violate this Order.
48. Within ten (10) days of making the determination described in Paragraph 47 Respondent must submit to the Regional Director a report detailing (a) the practices that violate the Order, (b) the specific agents engaged in the practices in question, and (c) a plan to ensure that the practices cease and to remediate any harm resulting from the practices.
49. With regard to pending Collections Lawsuits filed by a Law Firm in which Respondent executed an Affidavit that was filed in support of the pending Collection Lawsuit and that contains any misrepresentations—including but

not limited to false statements that the Affiant: (1) is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer's education loan records or the maintenance of those records, (2) has personal knowledge of the consumer's indebtedness, (3) has personal knowledge of the loan's chain of assignment or ownership, (4) has personal knowledge about the maintenance of documents relating to the loan's chain of assignment or ownership, or (5) has attached as an exhibit a true and correct copy of a document—Respondent shall take the steps necessary, including getting permission from the successor special servicer, to direct Law Firms acting on behalf of the Trusts to withdraw such Affidavit unless the Trusts dismiss the suit in which the Affidavit was filed. Respondent shall take the steps necessary, including getting permission from the successor special servicer, to direct Law Firms acting on behalf of the Trusts to notify the court of the following in writing and must also simultaneously provide the court with a copy of the Consent Order entered into between the Bureau and the Respondent: "Plaintiff withdraws the affidavit of [insert name of Affiant] pursuant to Consent Order entered into by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Transworld Systems, Inc."

50. With regard to Collections Lawsuits that were filed in which Respondent executed an Affidavit that was filed with a court or in arbitration, and a judgment was entered, that contained any misrepresentations—including but not limited to false statements that the Affiant: (1) is familiar with or has personal knowledge of the Consumer's education loan records or the maintenance of those records, (2) has personal knowledge of the

Consumer's indebtedness, (3) has personal knowledge of the loan's chain of assignment or ownership, (4) has personal knowledge about the maintenance of documents relating to the loan's chain of assignment or ownership, or (5) has attached as an exhibit a true and correct copy of a document—Respondent must instruct the Law Firms to cease post-judgment enforcement activities and Respondent will take the steps necessary, including getting permission from the successor special servicer, to instruct the Law Firms acting on behalf of the Trusts to seek to remove, withdraw, or terminate any active wage garnishment, bank levies, and similar means of enforcing those judgments or settlements as well as cease accepting settlement payments related to any such Collections Lawsuits.

51. Respondents must cooperate in all respects with any directive from the successor special servicer acting on behalf of the Trusts to:
 - a. Make certain disclosures in connection with the collection of Debt owned by the Trusts;
 - b. Withdraw any Affidavit or Collection Lawsuit; or
 - c. Provide loan information or documents to the successor special servicer, including but not limited to, information and documents related to:
 - i. Whether certain loans owned by the Trusts are no longer legally enforceable because the applicable statute of limitations has expired;
 - ii. Whether Collections Lawsuits have been filed on any loans where sufficient documentation, including signed promissory notes and

documentation reflecting the complete chain of assignment from the Debt's originator to the Collection Lawsuit's named plaintiff, is not in the possession, custody or control of the Collection Lawsuit's named plaintiff to prove the existence of the Debt owed to the named plaintiff, or where the applicable statute of limitations has expired; and

- iii. Whether judgments were obtained in Collections Lawsuits described in Paragraph 51(c)(ii) and the identity of Consumers from whom the Trusts obtained payments in response to those Collections Lawsuits, and the specific amounts collected from these Consumers.

VII

Compliance Plan

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

52. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, Respondent must submit to the Regional Director for review and determination of non-objection a compliance plan designed to ensure that the Attorney Network business unit of Respondent complies with all applicable Federal consumer financial laws with respect to Collections Lawsuits and the terms of this Consent Order (Compliance Plan). The Compliance Plan must include, at a minimum:
 - a. Detailed steps for addressing each action required by this Consent Order;

- b. Comprehensive, written policies and procedures designed to prevent violations of Federal consumer financial laws and associated risks of harm to Consumers with respect to Collections Lawsuits;
- c. An effective employee training program required for all employees with any involvement in Collections Lawsuits, including but not limited to Affiants, whose duties include reviewing, executing, preparing, processing, verifying, , or notarizing of Affidavits that includes regular, specific, comprehensive training in Federal consumer financial laws commensurate with individual job functions and duties;
- d. Implementation of reasonable and appropriate written policies and procedures to ensure the proper notarization processes for Affidavits, including that notaries place the Affiants under oath and witness their signatures;
- e. Implementation of reasonable and appropriate written policies and procedures to ensure that Affiants verify the accuracy of each statement made in an Affidavit before executing the Affidavit;
- f. Comprehensive, written policies and procedures designed to ensure that any Law Firms engaged by Respondent to collect Debt do not violate any Federal consumer financial laws, which must include at a minimum:
 - i. the Law Firm's duty to maintain adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with Federal consumer financial laws;
 - ii. the Law Firm's duty to provide adequate training on compliance with all applicable Federal consumer financial laws and

- Respondent's policies and procedures related to Collections Lawsuits;
- iii. Respondent's authority to conduct periodic onsite reviews of the Law Firm's controls, performance, and information systems related to Collections Lawsuits; and
- iv. periodic review by Respondent of the Law Firm's controls, performance, and information systems related to Collections Lawsuits; and
- g. Specific timeframes and deadlines for implementation of the steps described above.
53. The Regional Director will have the discretion to make a determination of non-objection to the Compliance Plan or direct Respondent to revise it. If the Regional Director directs Respondent to revise the Compliance Plan, Respondent must make the revisions and resubmit the Compliance Plan to the Regional Director within thirty (30) days.
54. After receiving notification that the Regional Director has made a determination of non-objection to the Compliance Plan or any amendments thereto, Respondent must implement and adhere to the steps, recommendations, deadlines, and timeframes outlined in the Compliance Plan.

VIII

Role of the Board

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

55. Respondent's Board must review all submissions (including plans, reports, programs, policies, and procedures) required by this Consent Order prior to submission to the Bureau.
56. Although this Consent Order requires Respondent to submit certain documents for the review or non-objection by the Regional Director, the Board will have the ultimate responsibility for proper and sound management of Respondent and for ensuring that Respondent complies with Federal consumer financial law and this Consent Order.
57. In each instance that this Consent Order requires the Board to ensure adherence to or perform certain obligations of Respondent, the Board must:
 - a. Authorize whatever actions are necessary for Respondent to fully comply with the Consent Order;
 - b. Require timely reporting by management to the Board on the status of compliance obligations; and
 - c. Require timely and appropriate corrective action to remedy any material non-compliance with any failures to comply with Board directives related to this Section.

IX

Order to Pay Civil Money Penalties

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

58. Under section 1055(c) of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c), by reason of the violations of law described in Section V of this Consent Order, and taking

into account the factors in 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3), Respondent must pay a civil money penalty of \$2.5 million to the Bureau.

59. Within ten (10) days of the Effective Date, Respondent must pay \$1.5 million of the civil money penalty by wire transfer to the Bureau or to the Bureau's agent in compliance with the Bureau's wiring instructions. The remainder of the civil money penalty shall be paid in one installment within sixty (60) days of the Effective Date.
60. The civil money penalty paid under this Consent Order will be deposited in the Civil Penalty Fund of the Bureau as required by section 1017(d) of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d).
61. Respondent must treat the civil money penalty paid under this Consent Order as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes. Regardless of how the Bureau ultimately uses those funds, Respondent may not:
 - a. Claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction, tax credit, or any other tax benefit for any civil money penalty paid under this Consent Order; or
 - b. Seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made under any insurance policy, with regard to any civil money penalty paid under this Consent Order.
62. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil money penalty in any Related Consumer Action, Respondent may not argue that Respondent is entitled to, nor may Respondent benefit by, any offset or reduction of any compensatory monetary remedies imposed in the Related Consumer Action because of the civil money penalty paid in this action or because of any

payment that the Bureau makes from the Civil Penalty Fund (Penalty Offset). If the court in any Related Consumer Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Respondent must, within thirty (30) days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Bureau, and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the U.S. Treasury. Such a payment will not be considered an additional civil money penalty and will not change the amount of the civil money penalty imposed in this action.

X

Additional Monetary Provisions

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

63. In the event of any default on Respondent's obligations to make payment under this Consent Order, interest, computed under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, as amended, will accrue on any outstanding amounts not paid from the date of default to the date of payment, and will immediately become due and payable.
64. Respondent must relinquish all dominion, control, and title to the funds paid to the fullest extent permitted by law and no part of the funds may be returned to Respondent.
65. Under 31 U.S.C. § 7701, Respondent, unless it already has done so, must furnish to the Bureau its taxpayer identifying numbers, which may be used for purposes of collecting and reporting on any delinquent amount arising out of this Consent Order.

66. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of a final judgment, consent order, or settlement in a Related Consumer Action, Respondent must notify the Regional Director of the final judgment, consent order, or settlement in writing. That notification must indicate the amount of redress, if any, that Respondent paid or is required to pay to Consumers and describe the Consumers or classes of Consumers to whom that redress has been or will be paid.

XI

Reporting Requirements

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

67. Respondent must notify the Bureau of any development that may affect compliance obligations arising under this Consent Order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor company; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this Consent Order; the filing of any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding by or against Respondent; or a change in Respondent's name or address. Respondent must provide this notice, if practicable, at least thirty (30) days before the development, but in any case no later than fourteen (14) days after the development.
68. Within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date, and again one year after the Effective Date, Respondent must submit to the Regional Director an

accurate written compliance progress report (Compliance Report) that has been approved by the Board, which, at a minimum:

- a. Describes in detail the manner and form in which Respondent has complied with this Consent Order; and
- b. Attaches a copy of each Order Acknowledgment obtained under Section XII unless previously submitted to the Bureau.

XII

Order Distribution and Acknowledgment

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that,

69. Within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date, Respondent must deliver a copy of this Consent Order to each of its board members as well as to any managers, employees, Service Providers, or other agents and representatives who have responsibilities related to the subject matter of the Consent Order.
70. For five (5) years from the Effective Date, Respondent must deliver a copy of this Consent Order to any business entity resulting from any change in structure referred to in Section XI, any future board members or executive officers, as well as to any managers, employees, Service Providers, or other agents and representatives who will have responsibilities related to the subject matter of the Consent Order before they assume their responsibilities.
71. Respondent must secure a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of a copy of this Consent Order, ensuring that any electronic

signatures comply with the requirements of the E-Sign Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 7001-7031, within thirty (30) days of delivery, from all persons receiving a copy of this Consent Order under this Section.

XIII

Recordkeeping

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that

72. Respondent must create, or if already created, must retain for at least five (5) years from the Effective Date, the following business records:
 - a. All documents and records necessary to demonstrate full compliance with each provision of this Consent Order, including all submissions to the Bureau.
73. Respondent must retain the documents identified in Paragraph 72 for the duration of the Consent Order.
74. Respondent must make the documents identified in Paragraph 72 available to the Bureau upon the Bureau's request.

XIV

Notices

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

75. Unless otherwise directed in writing by the Bureau, Respondent must provide all submissions, requests, communications, or other documents relating to this Consent Order in writing, with the subject line, "*In re* Transworld Systems, Inc., File No. Year-CFPB- 0018," and send them either:
 - a. By overnight courier (not the U.S. Postal Service), as follows:

Regional Director, Bureau Northeast Region
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
140 East 45th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10017]

or

- b. By first-class mail to the below address and contemporaneously by email to Enforcement_Compliance@cfpb.gov:

Regional Director, Bureau Northeast Region
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
140 East 45th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10017

XV

Cooperation with the Bureau

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

76. Respondent must cooperate fully with the Bureau in this matter and in any investigation related to or associated with the conduct described in Section V. Respondent must provide truthful and complete information, evidence, and testimony and Respondent must cause its officers, employees, representatives, or agents to appear for interviews, discovery, hearings, trials, and any other proceedings that the Bureau may reasonably request upon ten (10) days written notice, or other reasonable notice, at such places and times as the Bureau may designate, without the service of compulsory process.

XVI

Compliance Monitoring

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to monitor Respondent's compliance with this Consent Order:

77. Within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a written request from the Bureau, Respondent must submit additional Compliance Reports or other requested information, which must be made under penalty of perjury; provide sworn testimony; or produce documents.
78. Respondent must permit Bureau representatives to interview any employee or other person affiliated with Respondent who has agreed to such an interview. The person interviewed may have counsel present.
79. Nothing in this Consent Order will limit the Bureau's lawful use of civil investigative demands under 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6 or other compulsory process.

XVII

Modifications to Non-Material Requirements

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

80. Respondent may seek a modification to non-material requirements of this Consent Order (*e.g.*, reasonable extensions of time and changes to reporting requirements) by submitting a written request to the Regional Director.
81. The Regional Director may, in his/her discretion, modify any non-material requirements of this Consent Order (*e.g.*, reasonable extensions of time and changes to reporting requirements) if he/she determines good cause justifies the modification. Any such modification by the Regional Director must be in writing.

XVIII

Administrative Provisions

82. The provisions of this Consent Order do not bar, estop, or otherwise prevent the Bureau, or any other governmental agency, from taking any other action against Respondent, except as described in Paragraph 83.
83. The Bureau releases and discharges Respondent from all potential liability for law violations that the Bureau has or might have asserted based on the practices described in Section V of this Consent Order, to the extent such practices occurred before the Effective Date and the Bureau knows about them as of the Effective Date. The Bureau may use the practices described in this Consent Order in future enforcement actions against Respondent and its affiliates, including, without limitation, to establish a pattern or practice of violations or the continuation of a pattern or practice of violations or to calculate the amount of any penalty. This release does not preclude or affect any right of the Bureau to determine and ensure compliance with the Consent Order, or to seek penalties for any violations of the Consent Order.
84. This Consent Order is intended to be, and will be construed as, a final Consent Order issued under section 1053 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5563, and expressly does not form, and may not be construed to form, a contract binding the Bureau or the United States.
85. This Consent Order will terminate five (5) years from the Effective Date or five (5) years from the most recent date that the Bureau initiates an action alleging any violation of the Consent Order by Respondent. If such action is dismissed or the relevant adjudicative body rules that Respondent did not

violate any provision of the Consent Order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the Consent Order will terminate as though the action had never been filed. The Consent Order will remain effective and enforceable until such time, except to the extent that any provisions of this Consent Order have been amended, suspended, waived, or terminated in writing by the Bureau or its designated agent.

86. Calculation of time limitations will run from the Effective Date and be based on calendar days, unless otherwise noted.
87. Should Respondent seek to transfer or assign all or part of its operations that are subject to this Consent Order, Respondent must, as a condition of sale, obtain the written agreement of the transferee or assignee to comply with all applicable provisions of this Consent Order.
88. The provisions of this Consent Order will be enforceable by the Bureau. For any violation of this Consent Order, the Bureau may impose the maximum amount of civil money penalties allowed under section 1055(c) of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c). In connection with any attempt by the Bureau to enforce this Consent Order in federal district court, the Bureau may serve Respondent wherever Respondent may be found and Respondent may not contest that court's personal jurisdiction over Respondent.
89. This Consent Order and the accompanying Stipulation contain the complete agreement between the parties. The parties have made no promises, representations, or warranties other than what is contained in this Consent Order and the accompanying Stipulation. This Consent Order and the

accompanying Stipulation supersede any prior oral or written communications, discussions, or understandings.

90. Nothing in this Consent Order or the accompanying Stipulation may be construed as allowing the Respondent, its Board, officers, or employees to violate any law, rule, or regulation.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 15th day of September, 2017.



Richard Cordray
Director
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Exhibit C

The New York Times | <https://nyti.ms/2vvroKs>

DealBook / Business & Policy

As Paperwork Goes Missing, Private Student Loan Debts May Be Wiped Away

By STACY COWLEY and JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG JULY 17, 2017

Tens of thousands of people who took out private loans to pay for college but have not been able to keep up payments may get their debts wiped away because critical paperwork is missing.

The troubled loans, which total at least \$5 billion, are at the center of a protracted legal dispute between the student borrowers and a group of creditors who have aggressively pursued them in court after they fell behind on payments.

Judges have already dismissed dozens of lawsuits against former students, essentially wiping out their debt, because documents proving who owns the loans are missing. A review of court records by The New York Times shows that many other collection cases are deeply flawed, with incomplete ownership records and mass-produced documentation.

Some of the problems playing out now in the \$108 billion private student loan market are reminiscent of those that arose from the subprime mortgage crisis a decade ago, when billions of dollars in subprime mortgage loans were ruled uncollectible by courts because of missing or fake documentation. And like those troubled mortgages, private student loans — which come with higher interest rates

and fewer consumer protections than federal loans — are often targeted at the most vulnerable borrowers, like those attending for-profit schools.

At the center of the storm is one of the nation’s largest owners of private student loans, the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts. It is struggling to prove in court that it has the legal paperwork showing ownership of its loans, which were originally made by banks and then sold to investors. National Collegiate’s lawyers warned in a recent legal filing, “As news of the servicing issues and the trusts’ inability to produce the documents needed to foreclose on loans spreads, the likelihood of more defaults rises.”

National Collegiate is an umbrella name for 15 trusts that hold 800,000 private student loans, totaling \$12 billion. More than \$5 billion of that debt is in default, according to court filings. The trusts aggressively pursue borrowers who fall behind on their bills. Across the country, they have brought at least four new collection cases each day, on average — more than 800 so far this year — and tens of thousands of lawsuits in the past five years.

Last year, National Collegiate unleashed a fusillade of litigation against Samantha Watson, a 33-year-old mother of three who graduated from Lehman College in the Bronx in 2013 with a degree in psychology.

Ms. Watson, the first in her family to go to college, took out private loans to finance her studies. But she said she had trouble following the fine print. “I didn’t really understand about things like interest rates,” she said. “Everybody tells you to go to college, get an education, and everything will be O.K. So that’s what I did.”

Ms. Watson made some payments on her loans but fell behind when her daughter got sick and she had to quit her job as an executive assistant. She now works as a nurse’s aide, with more flexible hours but a smaller paycheck that barely covers her family’s expenses.

When National Collegiate sued her, the paperwork it submitted was a mess, according to her lawyer, Kevin Thomas of the New York Legal Assistance Group. At one point, National Collegiate presented documents saying that Ms. Watson had enrolled at a school she never attended, Mr. Thomas said.

“I tried to be honest,” Ms. Watson said of her court appearance. “I said, ‘Some of these loans I took out, and I’ll be responsible for them, but some I didn’t take.’”

In her defense, Ms. Watson’s lawyer seized upon what he saw as the flaws in National Collegiate’s paperwork. Judge Eddie McShan of New York City’s Civil Court in the Bronx agreed and dismissed four lawsuits against Ms. Watson. The trusts “failed to establish the chain of title” on Ms. Watson’s loans, he wrote in one ruling.

When the judge’s rulings wiped out \$31,000 in debt, “it was such a relief,” Ms. Watson said. “You just feel this whole weight lifted. My mom started to cry.”

Joel Leiderman, a lawyer at Forster and Garbus, the law firm that represented National Collegiate in its litigation against Ms. Watson, declined to comment on the lawsuits.

Lawsuits Tossed Out

Judges throughout the country, including recently in cases in New Hampshire, Ohio and Texas, have tossed out lawsuits by National Collegiate, ruling that it did not prove it owned the debt on which it was trying to collect.

The trusts win many of the lawsuits they file automatically, because borrowers often do not show up to fight. Those court victories, which can be used to garnish paychecks and take federal benefits like Social Security from bank accounts, can haunt borrowers for decades.

The loans that National Collegiate holds were made to college students more than a decade ago by dozens of different banks, then bundled together by a financing company and sold to investors through a process known as securitization. These private loans were not guaranteed by the federal government, which is the nation’s largest student loan lender.

But as the debt passed through many hands before landing in National Collegiate’s trusts, critical paperwork documenting the loans’ ownership disappeared, according to documents that have surfaced in a little-noticed legal battle involving the trusts in state and federal courts in Delaware and Pennsylvania.

National Collegiate’s legal problems have hinged on its inability to prove it owns the student loans, not on any falsification of documents.

Robyn Smith, a lawyer with the National Consumer Law Center, a nonprofit advocacy group, has seen shoddy and inaccurate paperwork in dozens of cases involving private student loans from a variety of lenders and debt buyers, which she detailed in a 2014 report.

But National Collegiate’s problems are especially acute, she said. Over and over, she said, the company drops lawsuits — often on the eve of a trial or deposition — when borrowers contest them. “I question whether they actually possess the documents necessary to show that they own loans,” Ms. Smith said.

In an unusual situation, one of the financiers behind National Collegiate’s trusts agrees with some of the criticism. He is Donald Uderitz, the founder of **Vantage Capital Group**, a private equity firm in Delray Beach, Fla., that is the beneficial owner of National Collegiate’s trusts. (Mr. Uderitz’s company keeps whatever money is left after the trusts’ noteholders are paid off.)

He said he was appalled by National Collegiate’s collection lawsuits and wanted them to stop, but an internal struggle between Vantage Capital and others involved in operating the trusts has prevented him from ordering a halt, he said

“We don’t like what’s going on,” Mr. Uderitz said in a recent interview.

“We don’t want National Collegiate to be the poster boy of bad practices in student loan collections, but we have no ability to affect it except through this litigation,” he said, referring to a lawsuit that he initiated last year against the trusts’ loan servicer in Delaware’s Chancery Court, a popular battleground for corporate legal fights.

Ballooning Balances

Like those who took on subprime mortgages, many people with private student loans end up shouldering debt that they never earn enough to repay. Borrowing to finance higher education is an economic decision that often pays off, but federal

student loans — a much larger market, totaling \$1.3 trillion — are directly funded by the government and come with consumer protections like income-based repayment options.

Private loans lack that flexibility, and they often carry interest rates that can reach double digits. Because of those steep rates, the size of the loans can quickly balloon, leaving borrowers to pay hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of dollars each month.

Others are left with debt for degrees they never completed, because the for-profit colleges they enrolled in closed amid allegations of fraud. Federal student borrowers can apply for a discharge in those circumstances, but private borrowers cannot.

Other large student lenders, like Sallie Mae, also pursue delinquent borrowers in court, but National Collegiate stands apart for its size and aggressiveness, borrowers' lawyers say.

Lawsuits against borrowers who have fallen behind on their consumer loans are typically filed in state or local courts, where records are often hard to search. This means that there is no national tally of just how often National Collegiate's trusts have gone to court.

Very few cases ever make it to trial, according to court records and borrowers' lawyers. Once borrowers are sued, most either choose to settle or ignore the summons, which allows the trusts to obtain a default judgment.

“It’s a numbers game,” said Richard D. Gaudreau, a lawyer in New Hampshire who has defended against several National Collegiate lawsuits. “My experience is they try to bully you at first, and then if you’re not susceptible to that, they back off, because they don’t really want to litigate these cases.”

Transworld Systems, a debt collector, brings most of the lawsuits for National Collegiate against delinquent borrowers. And in legal filings, it is usually a Transworld representative who swears to the accuracy of the records backing up the loan. Transworld did not respond to a request for comment.

Hundreds of cases have been dismissed when borrowers challenge them, according to lawyers, often because the trusts do not produce the paperwork needed to proceed.

‘We Need Answers’

Jason Mason, 35, was sued over \$11,243 in student loans he took out to finance his freshman year at California State University, Dominguez Hills. His lawyer, Joe Villaseñor of the Legal Aid Society of San Diego, got the case dismissed in 2013, after the trust’s representative did not show up for a court-ordered deposition. It is unclear if the trusts had the paperwork they would have needed to prove their case, Mr. Villaseñor said.

“It was a scary time,” Mr. Mason said of being taken to court. “I didn’t know how they would come after me, or seize whatever I had, to get the money.”

Nancy Thompson, a lawyer in Des Moines, represented students in at least 30 cases brought by National Collegiate in the past few years. All were dismissed before trial except three. Of those, Ms. Thompson won two and lost one, according to her records. In every case, the paperwork Transworld submitted to the court had critical omissions or flaws, she said.

National Collegiate’s beneficial owner, Mr. Uderitz, hired a contractor in 2015 to audit the servicing company that bills National Collegiate’s borrowers each month and is supposed to maintain custody of many loan documents critical for collection cases.

A random sample of nearly 400 National Collegiate loans found not a single one had assignment paperwork documenting the chain of ownership, according to a report they had prepared.

While Mr. Uderitz wants to collect money from students behind on their bills, he says he wants the lawsuits against borrowers to stop, at least until he can get more information about the documentation that underpins the loans.

“It’s fraud to try to collect on loans that you don’t own,” Mr. Uderitz said. “We want no part of that. If it’s a loan we’re owed fairly, we want to collect. We need answers on this.”

Keith New, a spokesman for the servicer, the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (known to borrowers as American Education Services), said, “We believe that the auditors were misinformed about the scope of P.H.E.A.A.’s contractual obligations. We are confident that the litigation will reveal that the agency has acted properly and in accordance with its agreements.”

The legal wrangling — now playing out in three separate court cases in Pennsylvania and Delaware — has dragged on for more than a year, with no imminent resolution in sight. Borrowers are caught in the turmoil. Thousands of them are unable to get answers about critical aspects of their loans because none of the parties involved can agree on who has the authority to make decisions. Some 2,000 borrower requests for forbearance and other help have gone unanswered, according to a court filing late last year.

Correction: July 19, 2017

An article on Tuesday about missing paperwork for private student loans referred imprecisely to how debt collectors may garnish federal benefits like Social Security from borrowers. The collectors can in some circumstances take benefits after they are deposited in a bank account; they cannot garnish the benefits directly.

Susan C. Beachy contributed research.

A version of this article appears in print on July 18, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Lost Paperwork May Erase Student Debt for Tens of Thousands.

Exhibit D

The New York Times | <https://nyti.ms/2jlqMpZ>

DealBook / Business & Policy

Behind the Lucrative Assembly Line of Student Debt Lawsuits

By STACY COWLEY and JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG NOV. 13, 2017

A woman in a suburb of Columbus, Ohio, was sued twice, by two different creditors, over the same overdue student loan. Another person, in Illinois, was taken to court over a loan that had already been paid off. And hundreds of borrowers faced lawsuits over debts so old that they were no longer legally collectible.

The cases all involved the same debt collector: Transworld Systems.

Student loans have soared over the last decade, becoming the largest source of household debt outside of mortgages. The tide of rising defaults has also turned into a lucrative business, with companies collecting tens of millions of dollars through settlements, wage garnishments and other compelled payments.

Transworld Systems has been one of most prolific debt collectors, filing more than 38,000 lawsuits in the last three years on behalf of a single client, the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts. But many of the cases were flawed, as the debt collector churned out mass-produced documentation based on scant verification, according to legal filings by a federal regulator and a New York Times analysis of court records from hundreds of cases.

In September, the regulator, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, accused National Collegiate and Transworld, in separate complaints, of using sloppy and illegal collections methods. Both parties agreed to settle and pay more than \$21 million in penalties and refunds.

National Collegiate and Transworld “sued consumers for student loans they couldn’t prove were owed and filed false and misleading affidavits in courts across the country,” said Richard Cordray, the consumer bureau’s director.

Most of the nearly \$1.5 trillion that Americans owe in student debt is backed by the federal government. When borrowers fall behind on those loans, the government can garnish their wages or seize their tax refunds.

Private loans, like those owned by National Collegiate, amount to more than \$100 billion. Those players have to go to court to get what they are owed.

Transworld’s high-volume tactics in such cases are common across the industry, according to borrowers’ lawyers and lawsuits. Court dockets are choked with faulty cases. Students have been sued for debts they no longer owed, by companies they never borrowed from, and by creditors that lacked the legal standing to sue in the first place, records show.

Alarmed by such problems, judges in Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York and other states have quashed hundreds of lawsuits.

“This is robo-signing all over again,” said Robyn Smith, a lawyer with the National Consumer Law Center, a nonprofit advocacy group, referring to the way that banks, at the height of the mortgage crisis, brought thousands of foreclosure lawsuits without reviewing the underlying paperwork.

Assembly-Line Reviews

From the outside, the squat, industrial office park in Norcross, Ga., is unremarkable, just another in a stretch of low-hung buildings along a road dotted with pines.

Inside, Transworld's litigation machine cranks out the paperwork for thousands of lawsuits each year against borrowers who have fallen behind on their student loans.

The process for producing legal filings runs like an assembly line for making widgets. Transworld employees review 30 or 40 borrower files in a typical day, according to testimony from Bradley Luke, the company's senior litigation paralegal, during a deposition in June.

When an affidavit, a legally binding statement laying out evidence in a case, is needed, Transworld's software automatically fills in details like the amount owed, according to Mr. Luke's testimony. From there, a document production team finishes preparing the file, then hands it over to an "affiant" — typically a low-level employee with no legal training — for a review and signature.

The affiants are a critical link in the litigation chain, swearing in many cases that they had "personal knowledge of the business records," according to court records. But Transworld's employees did not have personal knowledge, the consumer bureau said in its complaint against the debt collector.

Other companies had created the records reviewed by Transworld employees. Those workers, the consumer bureau said, did not know how the data was maintained and whether it was correct. Even so, employees signed the forms "for fear of losing their jobs," according to the bureau's complaint.

The hasty review process obscured defects. More than 800 cases involved apparent time travel: In those instances, Transworld employees swore that borrowers' loans had been purchased by investors on dates that were months or even years before the loans were actually made.

Transworld, based in Fort Washington, Pa., said it disagreed with many of the consumer bureau's accusations. The company agreed to settle the case, it said in a statement, to avoid the cost and distraction of litigation.

The company's review process "accords with all industry best practices and relevant law," David Zwick, Transworld's chief financial officer, said in a statement

to The Times.

Transworld “processes thousands of affidavits, and while our error rate is exceptionally low, we believe that any mistake is unacceptable,” Mr. Zwick said. “We will continue to regularly review everything we do in order to ensure the highest standards of quality control.”

Lisa Kyser, in Pataskala, Ohio, said she got tangled up in one of Transworld’s mistakes. She took out half a dozen student loans as she juggled her college studies with full-time jobs, but she thought she had all of them under control.

In June 2016, Ms. Kyser got a summons notifying her that she was being sued for falling behind on a \$12,000 loan made in 2006. Two weeks later, she got a second summons also seeking payment — to a different creditor, for a different amount — on the same loan.

“I called the opposing counsel from both firms and said, ‘You can’t both be right,’” said Emily White, a lawyer in Columbus, Ohio, who represented Ms. Kyser.

The cases lingered for five months, while Ms. Kyser racked up legal fees. In the end, after her lawyer continually pestered them, the law firms that sued Ms. Kyser — both working for Transworld — withdrew the cases.

Courts Digging Deeper

The stacks of legal documents Transworld prepared in that Georgia office park made their way to courts across the country.

Many of the cases sailed through, unchallenged. Borrowers often do not fight collection lawsuits, which allows the creditor to win by default.

Even when defendants did respond, some judges brushed off their objections. In Miami, a law firm working for Transworld brought a lawsuit last year against Antonio Fuentes, seeking payment on a \$13,356 student loan. With interest and fees, Mr. Fuentes now owed \$25,322.31, according to the complaint.

Mr. Fuentes, representing himself, admitted that he had taken the loan but disputed the amount he was said to owe. A Transworld employee swore in an affidavit that the tally was correct. The judge sided with Transworld and ordered Mr. Fuentes to pay the full amount.

“The courts are often not sympathetic to these cases,” said N. James Turner, a lawyer in Orlando, Fla., who represents borrowers. “Many judges take the attitude: ‘I paid my student loans. You ought to pay yours. Don’t give me this nonsense about technicalities.’”

But some judges are starting to raise questions about collection cases.

Last year, a California appeals court cast doubt on the company’s affidavits. Employees of Transworld, then known as NCO Financial Systems, were not “personally familiar” with the records they swore were accurate, the judges wrote, and therefore could not vouch for them in court. The case was tossed out.

It’s not just debt collectors facing judicial skepticism, but also the creditors themselves.

A New York judge questioned whether Navient, the nation’s largest owner of private student loan debt, had a right to collect on some loans at all in the state.

At the center of that decision was Stefanie Gray, who fell behind on \$36,000 in private student loans from Navient, with interest rates as high as 14 percent.

Ms. Gray, 29, said she pleaded with the company for relief, but it would not budge. “I could barely pay rent, and was on food stamps at the time,” she said. Unable to keep up with the ballooning debt, she defaulted.

Navient filed four lawsuits against Ms. Gray in 2013. With help from Kevin Thomas, a lawyer with the New York Legal Assistance Group, a nonprofit organization that helps low-income residents, she fought back by challenging the creditor’s standing to sue in New York courts. Navient’s student loan trusts — the investment vehicles that owned her debt — had not registered to do business in the state, she claimed in her legal filings.

Judge James d'Auguste of the New York State Supreme Court's civil division in Manhattan agreed. He dismissed all four lawsuits, on the grounds that Navient's trusts did not have standing to pursue the cases.

A justice on the New York State Supreme Court ruled differently last year on a separate case that raised the same defense. He denied a dismissal motion and said that the standing of Navient's trusts to sue should be addressed at trial. The case is still pending.

Patricia Nash Christel, a spokeswoman for Navient, declined to comment on specific cases.

"We pursue litigation as a last resort for a tiny fraction of individuals — less than 1 percent of defaulted private education loan borrowers — and each case is individually reviewed and prepared," Ms. Christel said.

A Brawl Brews

The consumer bureau's action against National Collegiate and Transworld was intended to sideline the aggressive litigators.

Under the settlement terms, National Collegiate would be forbidden from collecting on the judgments its trusts have already won, or bringing any new cases, until it had completed an audit of the paperwork underpinning every single one of its 800,000 loans — an expensive and time-consuming slog.

But the deal, struck in September, may be falling apart.

The settlement requires court approval, usually a rubber stamp when both sides have agreed to the terms. The case was submitted to the United States District Court in Delaware.

The trusts' beneficial owner, Donald Uderitz, the founder of Vantage Capital Group, a private equity firm in Delray Beach, Fla., approved the agreement with the consumer bureau. Within days of its announcement, though, seven other parties involved in or working for the trusts, including Transworld, filed motions asking the court to reject it.

(The separate settlement that Transworld reached with the consumer bureau did not need court approval. It has already taken effect, although it does not prevent Transworld from hiring law firms to file debt collection cases.)

Until the court sorts out the dispute on National Collegiate settlement — which could take months, if not years — most of the deal is blocked from taking effect. That means that Transworld can continue bringing new lawsuits for National Collegiate against borrowers behind on their student loans.

In Ohio, Ms. Kyser’s home state, law firms acting on Transworld’s behalf have already filed at least 30 new collection cases in the past month.

Susan C. Beachy contributed research.

Exhibit E

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE**

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU

Plaintiff,

v.

THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE MASTER
STUDENT LOAN TRUST; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST
2003-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2004-1;
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT
LOAN TRUST 2004-2; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST
2005-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2005-2;
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT
LOAN TRUST 2005-3; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST
2006-1; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-2;
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT
LOAN TRUST 2006-3; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST
2006-4; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2007-1;
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT
LOAN TRUST 2007-2; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST
2007-3; and NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2007-4,
Delaware Statutory Trusts,

Defendants.

Case No. _____

**COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT
INJUNCTION AND OTHER RELIEF**

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“Bureau”), brings

this action against the fifteen (15) National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (“Defendants,” or “NCSLTs”, or “the Trusts”) under sections 1031(a), 1036(a), and 1054(a) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (“CFPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a), 5564(a), to obtain permanent injunctive relief, restitution, refunds, disgorgement, damages, civil money penalties, and other appropriate relief for Defendants’ violations of Federal consumer financial law in connection with Defendants’ servicing and collection of private student loan debt.

2. The Bureau has reviewed the debt collection and litigation practices of the fifteen (15) Delaware statutory trusts referred to as the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts, which are the National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, NCSLT 2003-1, NCSLT 2004-1, NCSLT 2004-2, NCSLT 2005-1, NCSLT 2005-2, NCSLT 2005-3, NCSLT 2006-1, NCSLT 2006-2, NCSLT 2006-3, NCSLT 2006-4, NCSLT 2007-1, NCSLT 2007-2, NCSLT 2007-3, and NCSLT 2007-4), as performed by Defendants’ Servicers and Subservicers (as defined below) pursuant to the various servicing agreements between Defendants and each such Servicer or agreements between a Servicer and a Subservicer.

3. To collect on defaulted private student loans, Defendants’ Servicers filed collections lawsuits on behalf of Defendants in state courts across the country. In support of these lawsuits, Subservicers on behalf of Defendants executed and filed affidavits that falsely claimed personal knowledge of the account records and the consumer’s debt and, in many cases, personal knowledge of the chain of assignments establishing ownership of the loans. In addition, Defendants’ Servicers on behalf of Defendants filed at least 2,000 collections lawsuits without the documentation necessary to prove Trust ownership of the loans or on debt that was time-barred. Finally, notaries for Defendants’ Servicers notarized more than 25,000 affidavits even

though they did not witness the affiants' signatures.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because it is brought under Federal consumer financial law, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(1), presents a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is brought by an agency of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1345.

5. Venue is proper in this District because Defendants are located and do business in this District. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(f).

PLAINTIFF

6. The Bureau is an independent agency of the United States charged with regulating the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under Federal consumer financial laws. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). The Bureau has independent litigating authority to enforce Federal consumer financial laws, including the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5564(a)–(b).

DEFENDANTS

7. Defendants are any and all of the fifteen (15) Delaware statutory trusts referred to as the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (“NCSLTs” or “the Trusts,” which are the National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, NCSLT 2003-1, NCSLT 2004-1, NCSLT 2004-2, NCSLT 2005-1, NCSLT 2005-2, NCSLT 2005-3, NCSLT 2006-1, NCSLT 2006-2, NCSLT 2006-3, NCSLT 2006-4, NCSLT 2007-1, NCSLT 2007-2, NCSLT 2007-3, and NCSLT 2007-4) and their successors and assigns.

8. Defendants are “covered person[s]” under 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) because they engaged in “servicing loans, including acquiring, purchasing selling [or] brokering” and in the collection of debt. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(i), (x).

DEFENDANTS' UNLAWFUL ACTS OR PRACTICES

9. The NCSLTs comprise fifteen (15) Delaware statutory trusts created between 2001 and 2007.

10. The basic purpose of each Trust is to acquire a pool of private student loans, execute the indentures and issue notes secured by the pools of student loans, enter into the so-called trust-related agreements, and provide for the administration of the Trusts and the servicing and collection of student loans.

11. Each Trust is an Owner-directed Delaware statutory trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

12. Defendants do not have employees, and all actions relating to the administration of the Trusts, servicing of the student loans, and collecting debt are carried out by Defendants' Servicers.

13. Defendants' Servicers are any Servicer, Primary Servicer, Subservicer, Special Servicer, Administrator, and any other individual or entity acting on behalf of the Trusts with respect to the servicing and collection of the student loans owned by the Trusts, whether retained directly by Defendants or retained by an individual or entity acting on behalf of Defendants.

14. Each Servicer is a "covered person" under 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) because it engaged in "servicing loans, including acquiring, purchasing, selling, [or] brokering" and in "collecting debt." 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(i), (x).

15. Each Servicer acted as an agent of the Trusts.

16. Since November 1, 2014, Defendants' Subservicer has been Transworld Systems, Inc.

17. The Trusts hold more than 800,000 private student loans sold by originating lenders to the Trusts.

18. Debt-collection activities on behalf of Defendants are carried out by Defendants' Servicers, including the Special Servicer and the Subservicers.

19. Defendants' Servicers and other entities executed, notarized, and filed deceptive affidavits on behalf of Defendants.

20. Defendants' Servicers and other entities, on behalf of Defendants, filed collections lawsuits lacking documentation needed to prove ownership of the loans.

21. In 2009, Defendants entered into a special servicing agreement with the Special Servicer in order to provide for the servicing, collection, and litigation of delinquent and defaulted loans. This agreement required the Special Servicer to hire Subservicers and enter into and adhere to the Default Prevention and Collection Services Agreement of March 1, 2009, as amended.

22. In 2012, upon the resignation of the Special Servicer and pursuant to the terms of the special servicing agreement, the Back-Up Special Servicer assumed the role of Special Servicer.

23. In 2012, the Special Servicer amended the Default Prevention and Collection Services Agreement of March 1, 2009 in order to expand the role of the Subservicer to Defendants with respect to the collection and enforcement of the student loans owned by Defendants.

FALSE AND MISLEADING AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONY

24. In connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt from consumers, between November 1, 2012 and April 25, 2016, Subservicers, acting through

Defendants' Special Servicer and acting on behalf of Defendants, initiated 94,046 collections lawsuits in courts across the country.

25. In support of the collections lawsuits, Subservicers acting on behalf of Defendants submitted affidavits and documents in support of Defendants' claims that consumers owed debts to Defendants.

26. Affiants on behalf of Defendants executed, notarized, and caused to be filed affidavits—often attaching exhibits—in Defendants' collections lawsuits.

27. In these affidavits, the affiants swore that they had personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the debt.

28. In fact, in numerous instances, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the debt when they executed the affidavits.

29. The affiants also swore in the affidavits that they were authorized and competent to testify about the consumers' debts through review of and "personal knowledge" of the business records, including electronic data, in their possession.

30. In fact, in numerous instances, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the business records, including the electronic data, showing that consumers owed debts to the Defendants.

31. Affiants were instructed to review data on a computer screen to verify information in the affidavits about the debts. Affiants, however, did not know the source of the data on that screen, how the data was obtained or maintained, whether it was accurate, or whether those data meant that the debt was in fact owed to Defendants.

32. Each affiant also swore that he or she had "personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of Plaintiff [the Trust] and the practices and procedures Plaintiff requires of its loan servicers and other agents."

33. In fact, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of Defendants and the practices and procedures of Defendants' agents.

34. In many affidavits, the affiants also swore, "I have reviewed the chain of title records as business records" regarding the relevant account.

35. In fact, in numerous instances, affiants did not review the chain of assignment records prior to executing the affidavits. In some cases, affiants reviewed only "chain of title" records that had been found online. In fact, at least one of Defendants' Servicers instructed affiants that they did not need to review the chain of assignment records before executing affidavits that represented that the affiant had reviewed those records.

36. In fact, affiants did not have access to deposit and sale agreements—the last link in the chain of assignment transferring loans into the Trust—until May 30, 2014.

37. In many affidavits, the affiants asserted that they had personal knowledge that the loans were transferred, sold, and assigned to the Trusts on dates certain.

38. In fact, affiants lacked personal knowledge of the chain of assignment records necessary to prove that the relevant Trust owned the subject loan.

39. In some instances, when affiants complained to management that they did not have personal knowledge of certain representations made in the affidavits, Defendants' Servicers instructed the affiants to continue signing the affidavits. In some instances, affiants felt "bullied" by management and followed the instructions for fear of losing their jobs.

40. On numerous occasions, to address a backlog of affidavits, employees of Defendants' Servicers such as interns and mailroom clerks were instructed to execute affidavits.

41. On numerous occasions, between November 1, 2012 and September 1, 2013, the Servicers filed stale affidavits that had earlier been executed by a previous Servicer. Contrary to the statements in the affidavits, the affiants in question were no longer "authorized to testify" in the matter and no longer had access or knowledge of the consumer's account records or debt.

42. Affiants also later provided live testimony in court, purportedly based on personal knowledge, similar to the statements made in the affidavits as described in Paragraphs 27-38.

IMPROPERLY NOTARIZED AFFIDAVITS

43. Between November 1, 2012 and August 3, 2014, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt from consumers, Defendants' Servicers acting on behalf of Defendants filed at least 11,412 affidavits in collections lawsuits.

44. Between November 1, 2012 and August 3, 2014, Defendants' Servicers acting on behalf of Defendants improperly notarized virtually every affidavit executed and filed.

45. Affiants executed the affidavits on their own outside the presence of the notary.

46. Affiants placed executed affidavits in a specified location.

47. Defendants' Servicers' notaries later notarized stacks of previously signed affidavits all at once at their desks.

48. Contrary to the representations in the affidavits, affiants did not personally appear before notaries.

49. Contrary to the representations in the affidavits, notaries did not place the affiants under oath or witness their signatures.

50. On numerous occasions, notaries notarized affidavits executed by affiants on a prior date. At least one of Defendants' Servicers instructed notaries to ensure that the notarization date matched the date of execution, even if that meant backdating the notarization date.

51. In many cases, the notaries did in fact back date their notarization of the affidavits.

**FILING LAWSUITS WITHOUT THE INTENT OR ABILITY
TO PROVE THE CLAIMS, IF CONTESTED**

52. Defendants filed at least 1,214 collections lawsuits against consumers even though the documentation needed to prove they owned the loans was missing. Through these lawsuits, the Defendants obtained approximately \$21,768,807 in judgments against consumers.

53. In these lawsuits, documentation of a complete chain of assignment evidencing that the subject loan was transferred to the Defendants was missing.

54. In addition, the Defendants filed at least 812 collections lawsuits where the documentation did not support Trusts' ownership of the loans. The chain of assignment documentation shows that these loans were allegedly transferred to Defendants before they were in fact disbursed to consumers.

55. In at least 208 other collections lawsuits, the promissory note to prove that a debt was owed did not exist or cannot be located.

56. For each collections lawsuit described in Paragraphs 52–55, Defendants could not prove that a debt was owed to Defendants, if contested.

57. Defendants knew, or their processes should have uncovered, that these chain of assignment documents were missing or flawed, yet Defendants continued to file collections lawsuits.

COLLECTION OF TIME-BARRED DEBT

58. In at least 486 collections lawsuits, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt from consumers, Defendants filed a collections lawsuit outside the applicable statute of limitations.

THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT

59. The CFPA provides that it is unlawful for any covered person “to offer or provide to a consumer any financial product or service not in conformity with Federal consumer financial law, or otherwise commit any act or omission in violation of a Federal consumer financial law.” 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(A). The CFPA grants the Bureau authority to commence a civil action against any person who violates a Federal consumer financial law, such as the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a).

VIOLATIONS OF THE CFPA

60. The CFPA prohibits a covered person from committing or engaging in any “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice” in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a)(1)(B).

61. Servicing loans and collecting debt are “consumer financial products or services” under the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(i), (x).

DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES

COUNT I

False and Misleading Affidavits and Testimony

62. The Bureau incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1–61 by reference.

63. In numerous instances, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt, Defendants represented to consumers, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, that affiants or witnesses in court had personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the debt.

64. In fact, in numerous instances, affiants and witnesses lacked personal knowledge of the education loan records evidencing the debt when they executed the affidavits.

65. In numerous instances, Defendants represented to consumers, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, that affiants and witnesses had personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of the Trust and the practices and procedures the Trust requires of its loan servicers and other agents.

66. In fact, affiants and witnesses lacked personal knowledge of the record management practices and procedures of the Trusts and the practices and procedures of Trusts' agents.

67. In numerous instances, Defendants represented to consumers, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, that affiants and witnesses had reviewed the chain of title records and asserted that they had personal knowledge that the loans were transferred, sold, and assigned to the Trust on dates certain.

68. In fact, on numerous occasions, affiants and witnesses had not reviewed the chain of title records and lacked personal knowledge that the loans were transferred,

sold and assigned to the Trust.

69. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraphs 63–68 are material and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

70. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraph 63–68 constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a)(1)(B).

COUNT II

Improperly Notarized Affidavits

71. The Bureau incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1–61 by reference.

72. In numerous instances, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt, Defendants represented to consumers, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, that the affidavits submitted in support of its collections lawsuits were properly sworn and executed before a notary.

73. In fact, in numerous instances, the affidavits were unsworn and executed outside the presence of a notary.

74. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraphs 72–73 are material and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

75. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraph 72–73 constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a)(1)(B).

COUNT III

Filing Lawsuits without the Intent or Ability to Prove the Claims, if Contested

76. The Bureau incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1–61 by reference.

77. In numerous instances, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt, Defendants represented to consumers, directly or indirectly, expressly or by

implication, that collections lawsuits were supported by valid and reliable legal documentation needed to obtain judgment.

78. In fact, in numerous lawsuits, documentation of a complete chain of assignment evidencing that the subject loan was transferred to Defendants was missing.

79. In fact, in numerous lawsuits, a promissory note proving the existence of the debt was missing.

80. In fact, in numerous lawsuits, the Trusts could not prove their claims, if contested.

81. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraphs 77–80 are material and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

82. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraph 77–80 constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a)(1)(B).

COUNT IV

Collection of Time-Barred Debt

83. The Bureau incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1–61 by reference.

84. In numerous instances, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt, Defendants represented to consumers, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, that the Trusts had a legal right to obtain judgment through its collections lawsuits.

85. In fact, in numerous instances, the statute of limitations on these loans had expired.

86. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraphs 84–85 are material and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

87. Defendants' representations set forth in Paragraph 84–85 constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a)(1)(B).

UNFAIR PRACTICES

COUNT V

Filing Lawsuits without the Intent or Ability to Prove the Claims, if Contested

88. The Bureau incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1–61 by reference.

89. Under section 1031 of the CFPA, an act or practice is unfair if it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c), 5536(a)(1)(B).

90. In numerous instances, in connection with collecting or attempting to collect debt through collections lawsuits, Defendants filed collections lawsuits without the intent or ability to prove the claims, if contested.

91. Defendants' acts or practices have caused or were likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, estimated to be at least \$3.5 million in payments made in connection with these lawsuits.

92. Consumers could not reasonably avoid the harm, and the harm was not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.

93. Defendants' acts or practices set forth in Paragraph 90–92 constitute unfair acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c), 5536(a)(1)(B).

CONSUMER INJURY

94. Consumers have suffered or were likely to suffer substantial injury as a result of Defendants' violations of the CFPA. In addition, Defendants have been unjustly

enriched as a result of their unlawful acts or practices.

THIS COURT'S POWER TO GRANT RELIEF

95. The CFPA empowers this Court to grant any appropriate legal or equitable relief including, without limitation, a permanent or temporary injunction, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of moneys paid, restitution, disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment, payments of damages or other monetary relief, limits on the activities or functions of Defendants, and civil money penalties. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a). In addition, the CFPB may recover its costs in connection with the action, if it is the prevailing party. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(b).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

96. Wherefore, the Bureau requests that the Court:
- a. Permanently enjoin Defendants from committing future violations of the CFPA;
 - b. Grant additional injunctive relief as the Court may deem to be just and proper;
 - c. Award such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers resulting from Defendants' violations of the CFPA, including, but not limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of moneys paid, restitution, disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment, and payment of damages or other monetary relief;
 - d. Award the Bureau civil money penalties; and
 - e. Award the Bureau the costs of bringing this action, as well as such other and additional relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper.

Dated: September 18, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

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